How long to Pareto efficiency?
We consider uncoupled dynamics (each player knows only his own payoff function) that reach outcomes that are Pareto efficient and individually rational. We show that in the worst case the number of periods it takes to reach these outcomes must be exponential in the number of players and hence the same number of periods it takes to reach Nash equilibria. For social welfare maximizing outcomes we provide a tight bound on the minimal number of steps required for reaching such an outcome by uncoupled dynamics. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Volume (Year): 43 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004.
"Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium,"
174, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2006. "Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 286-303, November.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 783, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000466, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp371, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Saari, Donald G & Simon, Carl P, 1978. "Effective Price Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(5), pages 1097-1125, September.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mansour, Yishay, 2010.
"How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 107-126, May.
- Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour, 2013. "How Long To Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity Of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 10, pages 215-249 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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