The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games
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Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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- Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Ishihara, S. & Muto, S., 2004. "On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games," Other publications TiSEM 66dd20be-cb4b-4b6d-937e-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Derks, Jean J M & Gilles, Robert P, 1995. "Hierarchical Organization Structures and Constraints on Coalition Formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(2), pages 147-63.
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