IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Savings and default

  • M. Peiris

    ()

  • Alexandros Vardoulakis

    ()

In the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, the optimal credit contract allows for the possibility of default. In addition, the optimal contract incorporates a precautionary savings motive over and above what agents would otherwise save. When default is sufficiently high, credit markets may collapse. A regulatory requirement on the level of savings can increase risk sharing and improve welfare by increasing the gains to trade in credit exchange. Under the appropriate verifiability condition on the level of savings, an appropriate market structure, agents voluntarily increase their level of storage such that trade and welfare improve. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-012-0722-2
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 54 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 153-180

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:1:p:153-180
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0722-2
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: http://saet.uiowa.edu/

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2001. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1304, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier & Parker, Jonathan A, 2001. "The Empirical Importance of Precautionary Saving," CEPR Discussion Papers 2737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Weil, Philippe, 1992. "Equilibrium asset prices with undiversifiable labor income risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 769-790.
  4. Andrés Carvajal & Marek Weretka, 2012. "No-arbitrage, state prices and trade in thin financial markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(1), pages 223-268, May.
  5. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
  6. Han Ozsoylev & Jan Werner, 2011. "Liquidity and asset prices in rational expectations equilibrium with ambiguous information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 469-491, October.
  7. José-María Da-Rocha & Eduardo-Luis Giménez & Francisco-Xavier Lores, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 499-535, August.
  8. Jonathan A. Parker & Bruce Preston, 2004. "Precautionary Saving and Consumption Fluctuations," Working Papers 140, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
  9. William R. Zame, 1992. "Efficiency and the Role of Default When Security Markets are Incomplete," UCLA Economics Working Papers 673, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Dimitrios Tsomocos & Charles Goodhart & M.U. Peiris & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2010. "On Dividend Restrictions and the Collapse of the Interbank Market," FMG Discussion Papers dp648, Financial Markets Group.
  11. GOBERT, Karine & POITEVIN, Michel, 1998. "Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 9806, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  12. Erwan Quintin, 2012. "More punishment, less default?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 427-454, November.
  13. Simeon Djankov & Oliver Hart & Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Debt Enforcement around the World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1105-1149, December.
  14. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
  15. Martin Shubik, 1970. "Pecuniary Externalities: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 288, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  16. Tsomocos, Dimitrios P., 2003. "Equilibrium analysis, banking and financial instability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 619-655, July.
  17. Weerachart Kilenthong, 2011. "Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(3), pages 475-501, April.
  18. Viral V. Acharya & Sergei A. Davydenko & Ilya A. Strebulaev, 2011. "Cash Holdings and Credit Risk," NBER Working Papers 16995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2008. "Collateral restrictions and liquidity under-supply: a simple model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 441-467, June.
  20. Freixas, X. & Holthausen, C., 2001. "Interbank Market Integration under Asymmetric Information," Papers 74, Quebec a Montreal - Recherche en gestion.
  21. Alain Chateauneuf & Luciano De Castro, 2011. "Ambiguity Aversion and Absence of Trade," Discussion Papers 1535, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Arturo Bris & Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, 2006. "The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganization," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1253-1303, 06.
  23. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1993. "Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving," Working Papers 502, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  24. Luciano Castro & Alain Chateauneuf, 2011. "Ambiguity aversion and trade," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 243-273, October.
  25. Antunes, António & Cavalcanti, Tiago & Villamil, Anne, 2008. "The effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 278-297, March.
  26. Christopher D. Carroll, 1992. "The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some Macroeconomic Evidence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 23(2), pages 61-156.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:1:p:153-180. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Rebekah McClure)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.