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Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games

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  • Jens Josephson

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Suggested Citation

  • Jens Josephson, 2008. "Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 381-389, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:35:y:2008:i:2:p:381-389
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0230-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
    2. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
    3. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
    4. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
    5. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sung-Ha Hwang & Jonathan Newton, 2017. "Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 589-604, October.
    2. Josephson, Jens, 2009. "Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1543-1554, August.
    3. Wang, Yuyao & Bu, Zhan & Yang, Huan & Li, Hui-Jia & Cao, Jie, 2021. "An effective and scalable overlapping community detection approach: Integrating social identity model and game theory," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 390(C).
    4. Abhimanyu Khan, 2021. "Evolution of conventions in games between behavioural rules," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 209-224, October.
    5. Louis, Philippos & Núñez, Matías & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 116-151.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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