IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v35y2008i2p367-379.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse

Author

Listed:
  • Hikmet Gunay

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Hikmet Gunay, 2008. "The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 367-379, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:35:y:2008:i:2:p:367-379
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0158-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-006-0158-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-006-0158-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Heidhues & Nicolas Melissas, 2006. "Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 531-557, August.
    2. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady & Martin Cripps, 2005. "Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 39-68, January.
    3. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927.
    4. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paul Heidhues & Nicolas Melissas, 2010. "Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-10-007, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    2. Aoyagi, Masaki & Bhalla, Manaswini & Gunay, Hikmet, 2016. "Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 565-600.
    3. Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
    4. Gong, Zheng & Tian, Feng & Xu, Boyan, 2013. "Limited Information Aggregation and Externalities - A Simple Model of Metastable Market," MPRA Paper 52143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Heidhues, Paul & Melissas, Nicolas, 2012. "Rational exuberance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1220-1240.
    6. Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Waiting for Signaling Quality," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 364-386, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
    2. Chong Huang, 2011. "Coordination and Social Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Marco Cipriani & Antonio Guarino, 2009. "Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 206-233, March.
    4. Boğaçhan Çelen & Kyle Hyndman, 2012. "An experiment of social learning with endogenous timing," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(2), pages 251-268, September.
    5. Driver, Ciaran & Trapani, Lorenzo & Urga, Giovanni, 2013. "On the use of cross-sectional measures of forecast uncertainty," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 367-377.
    6. Marcello Miccoli, 2012. "Optimal dynamic public communication," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 856, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    7. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2007. "Expectational coordination in a class of economic models: Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587837, HAL.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:7:y:2006:i:7:p:1-12 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2008. "The Optimal Choice of Pre-launch Reviewer : How Best to Transmit Information using Tests and Conditional Pricing," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 877, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    10. Andreas Blume & April Mitchell Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2021. "Dynamic coordination via organizational routines," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1001-1047, November.
    11. Jonathan E. Alevy & Michael S. Haigh & John List, 2006. "Information Cascades: Evidence from An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals," NBER Working Papers 12767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Schlegel, Friederike & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "Tapping the Financial Wisdom of the Crowd - Crowdfunding as a Tool to Aggregate Vague Information," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100563, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Riccardo Rebonato & Valerio Gaspari, 2006. "Analysis of drawdowns and drawups in the US$ interest-rate market," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(4), pages 297-326.
    14. Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2012. "Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 668-684.
    15. Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 150-182, February.
    16. Nimark, Kristoffer, 2008. "Dynamic pricing and imperfect common knowledge," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 365-382, March.
    17. Park, Andreas & Sgroi, Daniel, 2012. "Herding, contrarianism and delay in financial market trading," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1020-1037.
    18. Paul Beaudry & Franck Portier, 2014. "News-Driven Business Cycles: Insights and Challenges," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(4), pages 993-1074, December.
    19. Walther, A., 2012. "Asset price manipulation with several traders," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1242, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    20. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.
    21. Baddeley, Michelle & Parkinson, Sophia, 2012. "Group decision-making: An economic analysis of social influence and individual difference in experimental juries," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 558-573.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social (observational) learning; Information aggregation; Strategic delay (waiting); Experimentation; Coordination avalanche; Optimal stopping; C72; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:35:y:2008:i:2:p:367-379. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.