The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady & Martin Cripps, 2005.
"Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits,"
Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 39-68, January.
- Cripps, Martin William & Keller, R Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2003. "Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits," CEPR Discussion Papers 3814, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cripps, Martin & Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 2003. "Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits," Discussion Papers in Economics 4, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Paul Heidhues & Nicolas Melissas, 2006.
"Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 531-557, August.
- Paul Heidhues & Nicolas Melissas, 2003. "Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Heidhues, Paul & Melissas, Nicolas, 2005. "Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4995, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Heidhues, Paul & Nicolas Melissas, 2003. "Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The role of cohort effects," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 104, Royal Economic Society.
- Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, May.
- Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, May.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Aoyagi, Masaki & Bhalla, Manaswini & Gunay, Hikmet, 2016.
"Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 565-600.
- Masaki Aoyagi & Manaswini Bhalla & Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Social Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition," ISER Discussion Paper 0909, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
- Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Waiting for Signaling Quality," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 364-386, October.
- Gong, Zheng & Tian, Feng & Xu, Boyan, 2013. "Limited Information Aggregation and Externalities - A Simple Model of Metastable Market," MPRA Paper 52143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Heidhues, Paul & Melissas, Nicolas, 2012. "Rational exuberance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1220-1240.
More about this item
KeywordsSocial (observational) learning; Information aggregation; Strategic delay (waiting); Experimentation; Coordination avalanche; Optimal stopping; C72; D82;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:35:y:2008:i:2:p:367-379. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.