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The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse

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  • Hikmet Gunay

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Hikmet Gunay, 2008. "The role of externalities and information aggregation in market collapse," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 367-379, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:35:y:2008:i:2:p:367-379
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0158-7
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-006-0158-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady & Martin Cripps, 2005. "Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 39-68, January.
    2. Paul Heidhues & Nicolas Melissas, 2006. "Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 531-557, August.
    3. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, May.
    4. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aoyagi, Masaki & Bhalla, Manaswini & Gunay, Hikmet, 2016. "Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 565-600.
    2. Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
    3. Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Waiting for Signaling Quality," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 364-386, October.
    4. Gong, Zheng & Tian, Feng & Xu, Boyan, 2013. "Limited Information Aggregation and Externalities - A Simple Model of Metastable Market," MPRA Paper 52143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Heidhues, Paul & Melissas, Nicolas, 2012. "Rational exuberance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1220-1240.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social (observational) learning; Information aggregation; Strategic delay (waiting); Experimentation; Coordination avalanche; Optimal stopping; C72; D82;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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