Rational and Naive Herding
In social-learning environments, we investigate implications of the assumption that people naively believe that each previous person's action reflects solely that person's private information, leading them to systematically imitate all predecessors even in the many circumstances where rational agents do not. Naive herders inadvertently over-weight early movers' private signals by neglecting that interim herders' actions also embed these signals. They herd with positive probability on incorrect actions across a broad array of rich-information settings where rational players never do, and---because they become fully confident even when wrong---can be harmed on average by observing others.
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- Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, December.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Thomas R. Palfrey & Brian W. Rogers & Richard D. McKelvey, 2007.
"Self-Correcting Information Cascades,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 733-762.
- Goeree, Jacob & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian & McKelvey, Richard, 2004. "Self-correcting Information Cascades," Working Papers 1197, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Thomas R. Palfrey & Brian W. Rogers & Richard D. McKelvey, 2006. "Self-Correcting Information Cascades," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000211, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jacob Goeree & Thomas Palfrey & Brian Rogers, 2004. "Self-Correcting Information Cascades," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000153, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, December.
- Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
- Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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