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Information Use in Counter-Offer Decisions: An Examination of Factors that Influence Management Counter-Offer Decisions

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  • William MacKenzie

  • Brian Klaas

  • John McClendon

Abstract

We examine factors which influence manager assessments of employee value in response to outside employment offers. Data were collected from 312 managers on counter-offer decisions. We found the size of manager counter-offers increase as a result of the attractiveness of the outside offer, the presence of a neutral, third-party recommendation and when the recommending direct supervisor has an incentive to minimize compensation costs. Additionally, we found a significant interaction between offer attractiveness and third-party recommendation, where counter-offers made to employees with highly attractive offers increased more dramatically when a neutral manager recommended the employee in addition to the immediate supervisor. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • William MacKenzie & Brian Klaas & John McClendon, 2012. "Information Use in Counter-Offer Decisions: An Examination of Factors that Influence Management Counter-Offer Decisions," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 370-387, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jlabre:v:33:y:2012:i:3:p:370-387
    DOI: 10.1007/s12122-012-9140-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Di Mascio, Rita & Fatima, Johra, 2018. "The role of identification in frontline employee decision-making," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 131-138.

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