IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jlabre/v30y2009i2p168-175.html

Affirmative Action Can Increase Effort

Author

Listed:
  • James Fain

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • James Fain, 2009. "Affirmative Action Can Increase Effort," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 168-175, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jlabre:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:168-175
    DOI: 10.1007/s12122-009-9062-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12122-009-9062-9
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s12122-009-9062-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Andrew Schotter & Keith Weigelt, 1992. "Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 511-539.
    3. Steven Wu & Brian Roe, 2006. "Tournaments, Fairness, and Risk," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(3), pages 561-573.
    4. David Neumark & Harry Holzer, 2000. "Assessing Affirmative Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 483-568, September.
    5. Dukerich, Janet & Weigelt, Keith & Schotter, Andrew, 1990. "A game theory analysis of dual discrimination," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 21-41, October.
    6. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
    2. Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie‐Claire Villeval, 2009. "Self‐Selection And The Efficiency Of Tournaments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 530-548, July.
    3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
    4. Carolina Castagnetti & Luisa Rosti, 2012. "Unfair tournaments: gender stereotyping and wage discrimination among Italian graduates," DEM Working Papers Series 010, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management.
    5. Kräkel, Matthias, 2004. "Emotions and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1270, IZA Network @ LISER.
    6. Antonio Filippin, 2003. "Discrimination and workers' expectations," Departmental Working Papers 2003-15, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    7. Kräkel, Matthias & Szech, Nora & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2014. "Externalities in recruiting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 123-135.
    8. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Willem Verbeke, 2015. "The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 521-569.
    9. Christine Harbring, 2006. "The effect of communication in incentive systems-an experimental study," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 333-353.
    10. Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2020. "Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: Theory and experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 314-327.
    11. Ratul Lahkar & Rezina Sultana, 2020. "Affirmative Action in Large Population Contests," Working Papers 40, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    12. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022. "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
    13. Florian Ederer, 2010. "Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 733-769, September.
    14. Glenn Dutcher, 2011. "How does the social distance between an employee and a manager affect employee competition for a reward?," Working Papers 2011-29, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    15. Krakel, Matthias, 2000. "Relative deprivation in rank-order tournaments," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 385-407, July.
    16. Lee, Sam-Ho, 2013. "The incentive effect of a handicap," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 42-45.
    17. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2008. "How many winners are good to have?: On tournaments with sabotage," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 682-702, March.
    18. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2005. "How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage," IZA Discussion Papers 1777, IZA Network @ LISER.
    19. Matthias Kräkel, 2014. "Sandbagging," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(3), pages 263-284, June.
    20. Gerd Muehlheusser & Sandra Schneemann & Dirk Sliwka, 2016. "The Impact Of Managerial Change On Performance: The Role Of Team Heterogeneity," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1128-1149, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jlabre:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:168-175. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.