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On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences

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  • William Day
  • F. McMorris

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Suggested Citation

  • William Day & F. McMorris, 1994. "On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 11(2), pages 233-249, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jclass:v:11:y:1994:i:2:p:233-249
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01195681
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel & Fishburn, Peter C., 1986. "Algebraic aggregation theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 63-77, February.
    2. Jean-Pierre Barthélemy & F. McMorris, 1986. "The median procedure for n-trees," Journal of Classification, Springer;The Classification Society, vol. 3(2), pages 329-334, September.
    3. Roberts, Fred S., 1991. "Characterizations of the plurality function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 101-127, April.
    4. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bock, Hans-Hermann & Day, William H. E. & McMorris, F. R., 1998. "Consensus rules for committee elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 219-232, May.

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