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The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics

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  • Fabrizio Panebianco

    () (Bocconi University and IGIER)

Abstract

Abstract We analyze the evolution of a society in which types evolve not only depending on how much they are fit but also on how much they are able to persuade others about their fitness. This mechanism makes possible to reach equilibria not feasible under standard dynamics. We first provide necessary conditions for a generic matrix and generic class of cultural competition mechanisms in order to observe polymorphic equilibria, comparing it with the standard case. Then, necessary and sufficient conditions for polymorphic equilibrium stability are provided in the case of particular competition rule family, at each competition level. We show that some social dilemmas as prisoner’s dilemma or stag hunt can have their dynamics dramatically changed. We then analyze the prisoner’s dilemma framework finding that also full cooperation is sustainable in equilibrium. Finally we show that this persuasion mechanisms generally increase the equilibrium aggregate production of the society.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Panebianco, 2016. "The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(3), pages 233-258, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:63:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s12232-016-0253-4 DOI: 10.1007/s12232-016-0253-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Calabuig, Vicente & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2009. "Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 188-201.
    2. Cordes, Christian & Richerson, Peter J. & Schwesinger, Georg, 2010. "How corporate cultures coevolve with the business environment: The case of firm growth crises and industry evolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 465-480, December.
    3. Mengel, Friederike, 2008. "Matching structure and the cultural transmission of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 608-623, September.
    4. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
    5. Ken Binmore, 2006. "Why do people cooperate?," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 5(1), pages 81-96, February.
    6. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2006. "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 23-48, Spring.
    7. Guido Tabellini, 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(3), pages 905-950.
    8. Luigino Bruni & Fabrizio Panebianco & Alessandra Smerilli, 2014. "Beyond Carrots and Sticks: How Cooperation and Its Rewards Evolve Together," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 55-82.
    9. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
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    12. Luigino Bruni & Fabrizio Panebianco & Alessandra Smerilli, 2014. "Beyond Carrots and Sticks: How Cooperation and Its Rewards Evolve Together," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 55-82.
    13. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 75-111.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cultural evolution; Cultural transmission; Evolutionary selection; Cooperation; Prisoner’s dilemma;

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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