Migration decisions, expected remittances, and altruism
We investigate the effects of altruism on migration decisions by the potential migrant as well as the effects of altruism on remittances by the migrant to clarify how altruism affects remittances that the household in the home country will receive, i.e., expected remittances. Previous studies did not pay adequate attention to the effects of altruism on migration decisions of the potential migrant when examining the effects of altruism on remittances that will be sent from aboard. We find that if migration does not incur any costs, the potential migrant always migrates, and altruism increases expected remittances monotonically. On the other hand, if migration incurs costs, the potential migrant does not necessarily migrate, and the potential migrant with a higher degree of altruism is less likely to migrate. As a result, with migration costs, altruism may decrease expected remittances. Therefore, altruism does not increase expected remittances monotonically. Our results falsify the usual assumption of monotonicity regarding the effects of altruism on remittances. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
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Volume (Year): 59 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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