IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/grdene/v16y2007i6d10.1007_s10726-007-9084-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Resolving the empty core: trust as a determinant of outcomes in three-party negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Mara Olekalns

    (University of Melbourne)

  • Feyona Lau

    (University of Melbourne)

  • Philip L. Smith

    (University of Melbourne)

Abstract

This research examined how trust affected resource allocation in a three-party negotiation. Negotiators were presented with an empty core problem in which their theoretical share of resources exceeded the resources available for distribution. We tested which of three components of trust—reliability, predictability and empathy—predicted negotiators’ outcomes. We distinguished between absolute and relative trust. We found that relative trust was a more consistent predictor of individual outcomes than absolute trust and that the most trusted party in a network obtained the highest individual outcomes. This finding highlights the importance of social context in shaping trust judgements. The component of trust that predicted individuals’ outcomes was affected by structural power. High and low power negotiators benefited from conveying empathy (identity-based trust), whereas moderate power negotiators benefited from conveying predictability (knowledge-based trust). Low power parties also benefited from appearing unreliable (low calculus-based trust).

Suggested Citation

  • Mara Olekalns & Feyona Lau & Philip L. Smith, 2007. "Resolving the empty core: trust as a determinant of outcomes in three-party negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 527-538, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:16:y:2007:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-007-9084-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-007-9084-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-007-9084-8
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10726-007-9084-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ancona, Deborah G. (Deborah Gladstein). & Friedman, Ray. & Kolb, Deborah M., 1991. "The group and what happens on the way to 'yes'," Working papers 3262-91., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    2. Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook, 1980. "Vote trading: An experimental study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 151-184, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eric van Dijk & Varia Makagonova & Erik W. de Kwaadsteniet & Manon Schutter, 2017. "Deterrence-based trust in bargaining: Introducing a new experimental paradigm," Journal of Trust Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 71-89, January.
    2. Kowalski, Michał & Lee, Zach W.Y. & Chan, Tommy K.H., 2021. "Blockchain technology and trust relationships in trade finance," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    3. Roman Trötschel & Marie van Treek & Caroline Heydenbluth & Kai Zhang & Johann M. Majer, 2022. "From Claiming to Creating Value: The Psychology of Negotiations on Common Resource Dilemmas," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-26, April.
    4. Moshe Banai & Abraham Stefanidis & Ana Shetach & Mehmet Özbek, 2014. "Attitudes Toward Ethically Questionable Negotiation Tactics: A Two-Country Study," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 123(4), pages 669-685, September.
    5. Shay S. Tzafrir & Rudolph Joseph Sanchez & Keren Tirosh-Unger, 2012. "Social Motives and Trust: Implications for Joint Gains in Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(6), pages 839-862, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2014. "Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 411-428, September.
    2. Arthur J. H. C. Schram, 2008. "Experimental Public Choice," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 32, pages 579-591, Springer.
    3. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2021. "Vote Trading in Power-Sharing Systems: A Laboratory Investigation," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1849-1882.
    4. Larcinese, Valentino & Rizzo, Leonzio & Testa, Cecilia, 2005. "Allocating the US federal budget to the states: the impact of the President," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3611, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. O'Connor, Kathleen M., 1997. "Groups and Solos in Context: The Effects of Accountability on Team Negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 384-407, December.
    6. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Vote trading with and without party leaders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 115-128.
    7. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 3-19, March.
    8. Libby Jenke & Michael Munger, 2022. "Attention distribution as a measure of issue salience," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 405-416, June.
    9. Arthur Schram, 2016. "Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 214-226, June.
    10. Guerrero, Omar & Matter, Ulrich, 2021. "Quantifying Vote Trading Through Network Reciprocity," Economics Working Paper Series 2106, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    11. Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2020. "Agenda Control And Reciprocity In Sequential Voting Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1813-1829, October.
    12. William P. Bottom & Cheryl L. Eavey & Gary J. Miller, 1996. "Getting to the Core," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(2), pages 298-319, June.
    13. Tremewan, James, 2010. "Group Identity and Coalition Formation: Experiments in a three?player divide the dollar Game," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1020, CEPREMAP.
    14. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2021. "Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-26.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:16:y:2007:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-007-9084-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.