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Design and Implementation of Business Objects for Automated Business Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Haifei Li

    (University of Florida)

  • Chunbo Huang

    (University of Florida)

  • Stanley Y.W. Su

    (University of Florida)

  • Benny Higdon

    (Advanced Manufacturing Solution Development, IBM)

Abstract

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the specification, generation and exchange of business objects in the context of electronic commerce. Common business objects have been defined for product catalogs, purchase orders and other business entities. However, no business objects have been defined and implemented for supporting automated business negotiations even though business negotiation is very much an integral part of business activities. In this work, we have designed and implemented a set of business negotiation objects for supporting the bargaining type of business negotiations. These objects define the operations and information contents needed for negotiation parties to express their requirements and constraints during a bargaining process. They correspond to a set of negotiation primitives, which is a superset of the negotiation-related primitives defined in two popular languages: ACL and COOL. The implementation of these objects is patterned after the business object documents in the XML format proposed by the Open Applications Group, thus conforming to the established standard. The incorporation of several types of constraint specifications in these business negotiation objects provides the negotiation parties and the negotiation servers that represent them much expressive power in specifying call‐for‐proposals and proposals. Two synchronization problems and their solutions associated with the withdrawal and modification of negotiation proposals are addressed and presented in this paper. The use of these business negotiation objects in a bi‐lateral bargaining protocol is also presented. We have validated the utility of these objects in an integrated network environment, which consists of two replicated negotiation servers, two commercial products, and some other university research systems that form a supply chain.

Suggested Citation

  • Haifei Li & Chunbo Huang & Stanley Y.W. Su & Benny Higdon, 2002. "Design and Implementation of Business Objects for Automated Business Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-44, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:11:y:2002:i:1:d:10.1023_a:1014513300361
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1014513300361
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    3. Arvind Rangaswamy & G. Richard Shell, 1997. "Using Computers to Realize Joint Gains in Negotiations: Toward an "Electronic Bargaining Table"," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(8), pages 1147-1163, August.
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