Lock-up provisions and valuation of Turkish IPOs

I examine the association between lock-up length and valuation bias in a sample of 83 firms going public at Borsa Istanbul. The study is motivated by the fact that lock-up and valuation decisions are given simultaneously preceding the issue, so that lock-up information is incorporated into the valuation model. The problem is important because investors mostly rely on prospectuses to infer company value and make an informed investment decision. I hypothesize an inverse relationship between lock-up period length and valuation bias, on the basis that longer voluntary lock-ups would mitigate information asymmetry in the aftermarket and underwriters value issuers committed to long lock-ups more conservatively in anticipation. I find support for this prediction in the tests. Results show that issuers with long lock-ups are less overvalued relative to the issuers with short lock-ups, while signaling explanation of lock-ups is rejected for the Turkish market. The study contributes to the literature by showing that lock-up length selection plays a significant part in the pre-issue valuation, while market norms and concerns about regulations are paramount in the selection of lock-up length.