To dissent or not to dissent? Informative dissent and parliamentary governance
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References listed on IDEAS
- Castanheira, Micael & Crutzen, Benoît SY & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Party Governance and Political Competition with an Application to the American Direct Primacy," CEPR Discussion Papers 4890, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Augustin Landier & David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2009. "Optimal Dissent in Organizations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(2), pages 761-794.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2016. "The Economics of Politics: Patronage and Political Selection in Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 6233, CESifo Group Munich.
- Francois, Joseph & Rojas-Romagosa, Hugo, 2005.
"The Construction and Interpretation of Combined Cross-Section and Time-Series Inequality Datasets,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5214, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Klaas J. Beniers, 2005. "Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Joseph Francois & Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, 2007. "The Construction and Interpretation of Combined Cross-Section and Time-Series Inequality Datasets," IIDE Discussion Papers 20070805, Institue for International and Development Economics.
- Francois, Joseph F. & Rojas-Romagosa, Hugo, 2005. "The construction and interpretation of combined cross-section and time-series inequality datasets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3748, The World Bank.
- Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection," Working papers 63, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
More about this item
KeywordsDissent; Parliamentary government; Intra-party politics; Cabinets; C72; D72; D82;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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