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To dissent or not to dissent? Informative dissent and parliamentary governance

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  • Indridi Indridason

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  • Indridi Indridason, 2008. "To dissent or not to dissent? Informative dissent and parliamentary governance," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 363-392, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:9:y:2008:i:4:p:363-392
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-008-0046-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klaas J. Beniers, 2005. "Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Castanheira, Micael & Crutzen, Benoît SY & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Party Governance and Political Competition with an Application to the American Direct Primacy," CEPR Discussion Papers 4890, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D. & McLennan, Andrew, 1996. "Computation of equilibria in finite games," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: H. M. Amman & D. A. Kendrick & J. Rust (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 87-142, Elsevier.
    4. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties as Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489.
    5. Hans M. Amman & David A. Kendrick, . "Computational Economics," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number comp1.
    6. Kenneth L. Judd, 1998. "Numerical Methods in Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262100711, December.
    7. Augustin Landier & David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2009. "Optimal Dissent in Organizations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(2), pages 761-794.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Klaas J. Beniers, 2005. "Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection," Working papers 63, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    3. Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2020. "The economics of politics: patronage and political selection in Italy," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 27-48, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dissent; Parliamentary government; Intra-party politics; Cabinets; C72; D72; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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