IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/comgts/v21y2024i1d10.1007_s10287-024-00515-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal investment by large consumers in an electricity market with generator market power

Author

Listed:
  • Pranjal Pragya Verma

    (Indian Institute of Technology Madras)

  • Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh

    (KTH Royal Institute of Technology)

  • Steffen Rebennack

    (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

  • Derek Bunn

    (London Business School)

  • K. Shanti Swarup

    (Indian Institute of Technology Madras)

  • Dipti Srinivasan

    (National University of Singapore)

Abstract

The investment decisions of energy-intensive consumers can alter the balance of supply and demand in an electricity market. In particular, they can increase the market power of incumbent generators such that prices may increase as a consequence of their investments. Whilst it is therefore intuitive that such investors will wish to consider their effects on the market, it is a challenging problem analytically and one that has been under-researched. In general, the problem can be manifest in any supply chain where demand-side investments influence endogenous price formation in the intermediate product markets. Theoretically, we show how the presence of producer market power decreases demand-side investments and then, computationally we formulate a quad-level program to model the operational implications for a demand-side investor in more detail. With an innovative reduction in complexity to a bilevel model, an efficient solution algorithm for the optimal investment by a demand-side investor is facilitated. We demonstrate computability on a small scale electricity system and the results confirm the theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Pranjal Pragya Verma & Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh & Steffen Rebennack & Derek Bunn & K. Shanti Swarup & Dipti Srinivasan, 2024. "Optimal investment by large consumers in an electricity market with generator market power," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-56, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comgts:v:21:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10287-024-00515-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10287-024-00515-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10287-024-00515-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10287-024-00515-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen Frank & Steffen Rebennack, 2016. "An introduction to optimal power flow: Theory, formulation, and examples," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(12), pages 1172-1197, December.
    2. Anna Cretì & Fulvio Fontini, 2019. "Economics of Electricity. Markets, Competition and Rules," Post-Print hal-02304345, HAL.
    3. Bjørndal, Endre & Bjørndal, Mette Helene & Coniglio, Stefano & Körner, Marc-Fabian & Leinauer, Christina & Weibelzahl, Martin, 2023. "Energy storage operation and electricity market design: On the market power of monopolistic storage operators," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(2), pages 887-909.
    4. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, 1994. "Investment under Uncertainty," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 5474.
    5. MURPHY, Frédéric & SMEERS, Yves, 2010. "On the impact of forward markets on investments in oligopolistic markets with reference to electricity," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2216, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Biggar Darryl, 2009. "Is Protecting Sunk Investments by Consumers a Key Rationale for Natural Monopoly Regulation?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-25, June.
    7. Leautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2001. "Transmission Constraints and Imperfect Markets for Power," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 27-54, January.
    8. Browne, Oliver & Poletti, Stephen & Young, David, 2015. "How does market power affect the impact of large scale wind investment in 'energy only' wholesale electricity markets?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 17-27.
    9. Matthew Panhans & Lucia Lavric & Nick Hanley, 2017. "The Effects of Electricity Costs on Firm Re-location Decisions: Insights for the Pollution Havens Hypothesis?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(4), pages 893-914, December.
    10. Gregory Steeger & Steffen Rebennack, 2015. "Strategic bidding for multiple price-maker hydroelectric producers," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(9), pages 1013-1031, September.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    12. Hyoduk Shin & Tunay I. Tunca, 2010. "Do Firms Invest in Forecasting Efficiently? The Effect of Competition on Demand Forecast Investments and Supply Chain Coordination," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(6), pages 1592-1610, December.
    13. James T. Moore & Jonathan F. Bard, 1990. "The Mixed Integer Linear Bilevel Programming Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 911-921, October.
    14. Frederic Murphy & Yves Smeers, 2010. "On the Impact of Forward Markets on Investments in Oligopolistic Markets with Reference to Electricity," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(3), pages 515-528, June.
    15. Rahul Tongia & Varun Rai & Gireesh Shrimali, 2017. "India needs agency for energy data," Nature, Nature, vol. 541(7635), pages 30-30, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hao, Peng & Guo, Jun-Peng & Chen, Yihsu & Xie, Bai-Chen, 2020. "Does a combined strategy outperform independent policies? Impact of incentive policies on renewable power generation," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    2. Gal, Nurit & Milstein, Irena & Tishler, Asher & Woo, C.K., 2017. "Fuel cost uncertainty, capacity investment and price in a competitive electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 233-240.
    3. Walsh, Darragh & Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura & Di Cosmo, Valeria, 2016. "Strategic bidding, wind ownership and regulation in a decentralised electricity market," MPRA Paper 71502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Jiao Wang & Lima Zhao & Arnd Huchzermeier, 2021. "Operations‐Finance Interface in Risk Management: Research Evolution and Opportunities," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(2), pages 355-389, February.
    5. Yuzhou Jiang & Ramteen Sioshansi, 2023. "What Duality Theory Tells Us About Giving Market Operators the Authority to Dispatch Energy Storage," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(3), pages 89-110, May.
    6. Keppler, Jan Horst & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2022. "Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    7. Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2010. "Environmental Innovation, War Of Attrition And Investment Grants," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(01), pages 37-59.
    8. Aalbers, Rob & Shestalova, Victoria & Kocsis, Viktória, 2013. "Innovation policy for directing technical change in the power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1240-1250.
    9. David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2018. "Analyzing the Impact of Electricity Market Structure Changes and Mergers: The Importance of Forward Commitments," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-137, February.
    10. Chiara D’Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi & Sergio Vergalli, 2013. "Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 110(1), pages 25-43, September.
    11. Zheng, Shiyuan & Jiang, Changmin & Fu, Xiaowen, 2021. "Investment competition on dedicated terminals under demand ambiguity," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    12. Stronzik, Marcus, 2013. "Investitions- und Innovationsanreize: Ein Vergleich zwischen Revenue Cap und Yardstick Competition," WIK Discussion Papers 379, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    13. Peter Broer & Gijsbert Zwart, 2013. "Optimal regulation of lumpy investments," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 177-196, October.
    14. Luis M. Abadie & José M. Chamorro, 2011. "Valuing Expansions of the Electricity Transmission Network under Uncertainty: The Binodal Case," Energies, MDPI, vol. 4(10), pages 1-32, October.
    15. Nicolas Treich, 2000. "Décision séquentielle et Principe de Précaution," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 55, pages 5-24.
    16. Zheng, Shiyuan & Fu, Xiaowen & Jiang, Changmin & Ge, Ying-En, 2020. "Airline investments in exclusive airport facilities: Timing decisions under demand ambiguity," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 343-363.
    17. Victor Aguirregabiria & Allan Collard-Wexler & Stephen P. Ryan, 2021. "Dynamic Games in Empirical Industrial Organization," NBER Working Papers 29291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016. "How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 61-88, February.
    19. Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2015. "Tax Uniformity: A Commitment Device for Restraining Opportunistic Behavior," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(5), pages 641-672, October.
    20. Thomas Nagel & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2009. "Modeling investment behavior under price cap regulation," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 17(2), pages 111-129, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:comgts:v:21:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10287-024-00515-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.