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Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

Author

Listed:
  • Livino M. Armijos-Toro

    (University of Santiago de Compostela
    Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas ESPE
    CITMAga)

  • José M. Alonso-Meijide

    (University of Santiago de Compostela, Campus de Lugo
    CITMAga)

  • Manuel A. Mosquera

    (Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa
    CITMAga)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.

Suggested Citation

  • Livino M. Armijos-Toro & José M. Alonso-Meijide & Manuel A. Mosquera, 2024. "Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 336(3), pages 1373-1393, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:336:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10479-023-05340-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05340-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. László Á. Kóczy, 2016. "Power Indices When Players can Commit to Reject Coalitions," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-91, August.
    2. Annick Laruelle, 1999. "- On The Choice Of A Power Index," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    3. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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