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Reciprocal Altruism Under Conditions Of Partner Selection

Author

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  • Henk de Vos
  • Rita Smaniotto
  • Donald A. Elsas

Abstract

This paper is a contribution to solving the problem of whether reciprocal altruism can emerge and maintain itself in a population of selfish individuals. We use an evolutionary game theoretic simulation model (the Social Evolution Model) to investigate the relative fitness of two versions of a reciprocal altruistic trait competing with a defecting trait. One main difference between the Social Evolution Model and most of the models that are known in this field is that partner selection is straightforwardly built into the strategies of the players. In most of the models in the literature, partner selection is not an option in the game. Because of this element of forced play, much attention is given to the ability of strategies to detect cheaters and to retaliate. We show that modeling partner selection points to disadvantages of a preoccupation with cheater-detection and to the importance of committing oneself to a partner.

Suggested Citation

  • Henk de Vos & Rita Smaniotto & Donald A. Elsas, 2001. "Reciprocal Altruism Under Conditions Of Partner Selection," Rationality and Society, , vol. 13(2), pages 139-183, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:139-183
    DOI: 10.1177/104346301013002001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Neilson, William S., 1999. "The economics of favors," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 387-397, July.
    3. Evelien Zeggelink & Henk de Vos & Donald Elsas, 2000. "Reciprocal Altruism and Group Formation: the Degree of Segmentation of Reciprocal Altruists Who Prefer 'Old-Helping-Partners'," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 3(3), pages 1-1.
    4. Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1073-1081.
    5. Juan Carlos Martinez Coll & Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Limits of Reciprocity," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(1), pages 35-64, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. András Németh & Károly Takács, 2007. "The Evolution of Altruism in Spatially Structured Populations," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 10(3), pages 1-4.
    2. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Lau, C. Oscar, 2017. "Soft transactions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 122-134.
    3. István Back & Andreas Flache, 2006. "The Viability of Cooperation Based on Interpersonal Commitment," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 9(1), pages 1-12.

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