Social Roles As An Effective Learning Mechanism
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DOI: 10.1177/104346399011004001
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- Andreas Flache & Michael W. Macy, 2002. "Stochastic Collusion and the Power Law of Learning," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(5), pages 629-653, October.
- Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005.
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Keywords
evolution; imitation; improving; random matching; replicator dynamic; sampling;All these keywords.
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