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Representative Versus Direct Democracy: a Test of Allocative Efficiency in Local Government Expenditures

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  • Steven C. Deller

    (University of Maine)

  • David L. Chicoine

    (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract

The influence of government structure on the efficient allocation of public resources is examined A test developed by Brueckner is used to examine differences in the allocative efficiency of representative versus direct democracy forms of local government. The empirical results suggest that the form of government has no influence on the level of allocative efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven C. Deller & David L. Chicoine, 1993. "Representative Versus Direct Democracy: a Test of Allocative Efficiency in Local Government Expenditures," Public Finance Review, , vol. 21(1), pages 100-114, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:21:y:1993:i:1:p:100-114
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219302100105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
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    6. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
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    8. Sass, Tim R, 1991. "The Choice of Municipal Government Structure and Public Expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 71-87, August.
    9. Steven Deller & David Chicoine, 1988. "Representative versus direct democracy a Tiebout test of relative performance: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 69-72, January.
    10. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1979. "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 563-587.
    11. Sonstelie, Jon C. & Portney, Paul R., 1978. "Profit maximizing communities and the theory of local public expenditure," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 263-277, April.
    12. Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1987. "The economics of the local public sector," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 571-645, Elsevier.
    13. Deller, Steven C., 1990. "An application of a test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 395-406, November.
    14. Rexford Santerre, 1986. "Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 55-63, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Grossman, Philip J. & Mavros, Panayiotis & Wassmer, Robert W., 1999. "Public Sector Technical Inefficiency in Large U.S. Cities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 278-299, September.
    2. Partha Gangopadhyay & Shyam Nath, 2001. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Local Expenditure," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 38(13), pages 2379-2391, December.
    3. Feld, Lars P., 1997. "Exit, voice and income taxes: The loyalty of voters," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 455-478, September.
    4. Siân Mughan & Dallin Overstreet, 2023. "The impact of government form on resource allocation in local government, evidence from municipal court closures," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 3-26, July.

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