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Orthodox rational choice contractarianism

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  • Michael Moehler

    (Virginia Tech, USA)

Abstract

In a recent article, Gauthier (2013) rejects orthodox rational choice contractarianism in favor of a revisionist approach to the social contract that, according to him, justifies his principle of maximin proportionate gain (formerly the principle of minimax relative concession or maximin relative benefit) as a principle of distributive justice. I agree with Gauthier that his principle of maximin proportionate gain cannot be justified by orthodox rational choice contractarianism. I argue, however, that orthodox rational choice contractarianism, before and after Gauthier, is still a viable approach to the social contract, although the scope of this approach is limited. Orthodox rational choice contractarianism can be applied fruitfully to moral philosophy only in situations of deep moral pluralism in which moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning, because the members of society do not share, as assumed by traditional moral theories, a consensus on moral ideals as traditionally conceived as a starting point for the derivation of moral rules but only an overarching end that they aim to reach. If orthodox rational choice contractarianism is applied adequately, then it offers a viable approach to the social contract that, in contrast to Gauthier’s theory, justifies a rival principle for distributive conflicts that is valid for deeply morally pluralistic societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Moehler, 2016. "Orthodox rational choice contractarianism," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 15(2), pages 113-131, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:15:y:2016:i:2:p:113-131
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X15599102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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