The effect of alternation in power on electoral intimidation in democratizing regimes

There is as yet little consensus in the literature as to the underlying drivers of electoral violence. This article identifies a key mechanism explaining the use of electoral intimidation, a form of violence, in democratizing regimes. Within this context, we argue that the use of electoral intimidation against the opposition is most likely to be observed when a country moving to democracy has not yet experienced an electoral turnover. Building on previous theoretical and empirical findings, we provide evidence supporting the idea that alternation in power serves as an effective tool to decrease the tensions between electoral winners and losers. Furthermore, we show that alternation in power is conditional on the performance of electoral management bodies. Based on a sample of 331 elections in 53 countries that have inaugurated multiparty competition since 1989, we find strong and robust support for our theoretical claims. Firstly, we show how alternation in power is determined by the degree of autonomy the electoral management body adopted as part of the political opening process. Secondly, we provide evidence that electoral turnover depresses the use of electoral violence after controlling for relevant variables and correcting for selection issues.