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Solving the guardianship dilemma by war

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  • Jacque Gao

Abstract

This article develops a new theory of how dictators can solve the guardianship dilemma. I study a dynamic game to show that the dictator may build a large army and deal with the guardianship dilemma by resorting to international conflicts. Specifically, when a military revolt is imminent, the dictator can obtain enough resources to buy off the military by attacking and ultimately defeating his international opponent. The framework thus shows that a weakly institutionalized polity may either have a small military or have a large military and be more aggressive on the international stage.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacque Gao, 2021. "Solving the guardianship dilemma by war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 455-474, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:33:y:2021:i:4:p:455-474
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298211043235
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2010. "Persistence of Civil Wars," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 664-676, 04-05.
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    3. Mcmahon, R. Blake & Slantchev, Branislav L., 2015. "The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces—ERRATUM," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 636-636, August.
    4. Timothy Besley & James A. Robinson, 2010. "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian Control Over the Military," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 655-663, 04-05.
    5. James Morrow & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Randolph Siverson & Alastair Smith, 2006. "Selection institutions and war aims," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, January.
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