IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ecogov/v7y2006i1p31-52.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Selection institutions and war aims

Author

Listed:
  • James Morrow

    ()

  • Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
  • Randolph Siverson
  • Alastair Smith

Abstract

We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Suggested Citation

  • James Morrow & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Randolph Siverson & Alastair Smith, 2006. "Selection institutions and war aims," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:31-52 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0108-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-005-0108-z
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 2002. "Expressive Constitutionalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 299-311.
    2. Horowitz, Donald L., 2002. "Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(02), pages 193-220, April.
    3. Edward L. Glaeser, 2005. "The Political Economy of Hatred," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(1), pages 45-86.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, pages 620-652.
    5. Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, 1999. "On Political Representation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(01), pages 109-127, January.
    6. Voigt, Stefan, 2009. "Explaining constitutional garrulity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 290-303, December.
    7. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, pages 620-652.
    8. Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "War and Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 776-810, August.
    9. Alan Hamlin & Colin Jennings, 2004. "Group Formation and Political Conflict: Instrumental and Expressive Approaches," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 413-435, March.
    10. Tyler Cowen, 2004. "A Road Map to Middle Eastern peace? -- A Public Choice Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(1_2), pages 1-10, January.
    11. Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 828-846.
    12. Herschel Grossman, 2002. "Constitution or Conflict?," Working Papers 2002-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:31-52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.