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Senate Elections With Independent Candidates

Author

Listed:
  • Jac C. Heckelman

    (Wake Forest University, heckeljc@wfu.edu)

  • Andrew J. Yates

    (University of Richmond)

Abstract

Assuming strict two-party competition, policy balancing models of the US senate imply that senators from the same state will often be from opposite parties and have great ideological divergence. We analyze the effect of independent candidates on these implications. Our theoretical model implies the two state senators will generally not be from opposite parties and will be closer in ideological space than if they were elected under strict two-party competition. Empirical analysis of senate composition from 1991 to 2002 supports the theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Jac C. Heckelman & Andrew J. Yates, 2008. "Senate Elections With Independent Candidates," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 31-46, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:1:p:31-46
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629807084038
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Osborne Martin J., 1993. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January.
    2. Heckelman, Jac C., 2000. "Sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, May.
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    4. Hug, Simon, 1995. "Third Parties in Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 159-180, January.
    5. Thomas R. Palfrey, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 139-156.
    6. Jac C. Heckelman, 2004. "A Spatial Model of U.S. Senate Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(1_2), pages 87-103, January.
    7. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    8. Swank, Otto H., 2001. "A comment on sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 437-440, December.
    9. Cherry, Todd L & Kroll, Stephan, 2003. "Crashing the Party: An Experimental Investigation of Strategic Voting in Primary Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 387-420, March.
    10. Alberto Alesina & Morris Fiorina & Howard Rosenthal, 1991. "Why Are There So Many Divided Senate Delegations?," NBER Working Papers 3663, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bhattacharya, Kaushik, 2011. "Strategic Entry and the Relationship between Number of Independent and Non-Independent Candidates: A Study of Parliamentary Elections in India," MPRA Paper 46069, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2012.

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