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Why Are There So Many Divided Senate Delegations?

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Alesina
  • Morris Fiorina
  • Howard Rosenthal

Abstract

The last three decades have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of states with spilt Senate delegations, featuring two senators of different parties. In addition, there is evidence that senators of different parties do not cluster in the middle: they are genuinely polarized. We propose a model which explains this phenomenon. Our argument builds upon the fact that when a Senate election is held, there is already a sitting senator. If the voters care about the policy position of their state delegation in each election, they may favor the candidate of the party which is not holding the other seat. We show that, in general: (1) a candidate benefits if the non-running senator is of the opposing parry; (2) the more extreme the position of the non-running senator, the more extreme may be the position of the opposing party candidate. Our 'opposite party advantage' hypothesis is tested on a sample including every Senate race from 1946 to 1986. After controlling for other important factors, such as incumbency advantage, coattails end economic conditions, we find reasonably strong evidence of the 'opposite party advantage.'

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Alesina & Morris Fiorina & Howard Rosenthal, 1991. "Why Are There So Many Divided Senate Delegations?," NBER Working Papers 3663, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3663
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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    5. Campbell, James E. & Sumners, Joe A., 1990. "Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 513-524, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jac C. Heckelman & Andrew J. Yates, 2008. "Senate Elections With Independent Candidates," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 31-46, January.
    2. Heckelman, Jac C., 2000. "Sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, May.
    3. Stephan F. Gohmann & Robert L. Ohsfeldt, 1994. "Voting in the U.S. House on Abortion Funding Issues," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 455-474, October.
    4. Dean Lacy & Emerson M. S. Niou, 1998. "Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 89-110, January.
    5. Keith Krehbiel, 1996. "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 8(1), pages 7-40, January.
    6. Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Marimon, Ramon, 1997. "The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 957-976, December.

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