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Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy

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  • Tyler Kustra

Abstract

Why do some immigrant groups succeed in influencing the U.S. government to impose economic sanctions on their former dictators, while others do not? This paper begins by noting that the president is the pivotal player in sanctions policy and that presidents cater to voters in swing states. Therefore, a diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate should determine whether the American government imposes sanctions on their former homeland. Considering dictatorships from 1946 to 2005, this paper finds that a one-percentage-point increase in the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate increases the probability of regime-change sanctions by 11 percentage points. It then calculates causal estimates of the effectiveness of these sanctions on regime change. Using the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate as an instrumental variable for the presence of economic sanctions, it finds that sanctions do not have a positive, statistically-significant impact on regime change while a negative impact is plausible.

Suggested Citation

  • Tyler Kustra, 2022. "Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(3), pages 443-472, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:66:y:2022:i:3:p:443-472
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027211042681
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hana Attia, 2024. "Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 109-131, February.
    2. Tyler Kustra, 2023. "Economic sanctions as deterrents and constraints," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 60(4), pages 649-660, July.

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