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Inducing Cooperative Behavior among Proselfs versus Prosocials: The Moderating Role of Incentives and Trust

Author

Listed:
  • Christophe Boone

    (Department of Management, Faculty of Applied Economics, University of Antwerp, Antwerpen, Belgium)

  • Carolyn Declerck

    (Department of Management, Faculty of Applied Economics, University of Antwerp, Antwerpen, Belgium, carolyn.declerck@ua.ac.be)

  • Toko Kiyonari

    (School of Social Informatics, Aoyama Gakuin University, Sagamihara-city, Kanagawa, Japan)

Abstract

This study investigates how an individual’s social value orientation (SVO) interacts with explicit cooperative incentives on one hand, and intrinsic and extraneously induced trust on the other hand, to affect cooperative behavior. In three experiments, subjects (n = 322) played a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD; with weak cooperative incentives) and an assurance game (AG; with strong cooperative incentives) in conditions with or without trust signals. The authors found, as expected, that cooperative behavior is strongly spurred by explicit incentives, but not by trust, among people with a proself value orientation. Conversely, trust is very important to enhance cooperative behavior of participants with a prosocial value orientation, whereas explicit incentives are less important compared to proselfs. The authors conclude that this study reveals two fundamentally different logics of cooperative behavior: one based on extrinsic incentives and the other on trust.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Boone & Carolyn Declerck & Toko Kiyonari, 2010. "Inducing Cooperative Behavior among Proselfs versus Prosocials: The Moderating Role of Incentives and Trust," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 799-824, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:54:y:2010:i:5:p:799-824
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002710372329
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. White, Halbert, 1983. "Corrigendum [Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 513-513, March.
    2. Declerck, Carolyn H. & Kiyonari, Toko & Boone, Christophe, 2009. "Why do responders reject unequal offers in the Ultimatum Game? An experimental study on the role of perceiving interdependence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 335-343, June.
    3. Burnham, Terence & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L., 2000. "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-73, September.
    4. Toshio Yamagishi & Satoshi Kanazawa & Rie Mashima & Shigeru Terai, 2005. "Separating Trust from Cooperation in a Dynamic Relationship," Rationality and Society, , vol. 17(3), pages 275-308, August.
    5. Toshio Yamagishi & Shigeru Terai & Toko Kiyonari & Nobuhiro Mifune & Satoshi Kanazawa, 2007. "The Social Exchange Heuristic: Managing Errors in Social Exchange," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(3), pages 259-291, August.
    6. Knez, Marc & Camerer, Colin, 2000. "Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 194-216, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2016. "When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(16), pages 1157-1161, November.
    2. Brites, Alice Dantas & Morsello, Carla, 2018. "Effects of Economic Dependence and Cooperative Behavior Over Participation in Monitoring the Impacts of Natural Resource Trade," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 365-372.
    3. Flore Bridoux & Régis Coeurderoy & Rodolphe Durand, 2017. "Heterogeneous social motives and interactions: The three predictable paths of capability development," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(9), pages 1755-1773, September.
    4. repec:grz:wpsses:2013-05 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. DECLERCK, Carolyn H. & BOONE, Christophe & KIYONARI, Toko, 2011. "No place to hide: When shame causes proselfs to cooperate," Working Papers 2011018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    6. Loren Pauwels & Carolyn H. Declerck & Christophe Boone, 2017. "Watching Eyes and Living up to Expectations: Unkind, Not Kind, Eyes Increase First Mover Cooperation in a Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-13, April.

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