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Improving Balance in Educational Measurement: A Legacy of E. F. Lindquist

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  • Daniel Koretz

    (Harvard Graduate School of Education)

Abstract

A critically important balance in educational measurement between practical concerns and matters of technique has atrophied in recent decades, and as a result, some important issues in the field have not been adequately addressed. I start with the work of E. F. Lindquist, who exemplified the balance that is now wanting. Lindquist was arguably the most prolific developer of achievement tests in the history of the field and an accomplished statistician, but he nonetheless focused extensively on the practical limitations of testing and their implications for test development, test use, and inference. I describe the withering of this balance and discuss two pressing issues that have not been adequately addressed as a result: the lack of robustness of performance standards and score inflation. I conclude by discussing steps toward reestablishing the needed balance.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Koretz, 2024. "Improving Balance in Educational Measurement: A Legacy of E. F. Lindquist," Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, , vol. 49(6), pages 930-945, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jedbes:v:49:y:2024:i:6:p:930-945
    DOI: 10.3102/10769986231218306
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Jacob, Brian A., 2005. "Accountability, incentives and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 761-796, June.
    3. Neal, Derek, 2011. "The Design of Performance Pay in Education," Handbook of the Economics of Education, in: Erik Hanushek & Stephen Machin & Ludger Woessmann (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Education, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 495-550, Elsevier.
    4. David N. Figlio & Lawrence S. Getzler, 2002. "Accountability , Ability and Disability: Gaming the System," NBER Working Papers 9307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Derek Neal, 2011. "The Design of Performance Pay in Education," NBER Working Papers 16710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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