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The Wealth of the Unemployed

Author

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  • Jonathan Gruber

Abstract

Many studies have investigated the adequacy of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits as a form of income replacement, but few have looked at other resources with which the unemployed can finance their unemployment spells. This paper focuses on one form of resources, own wealth holdings. The author finds that the median worker's financial assets can cover roughly two-thirds of the income loss from an unemployment spell. Wealth holdings vary tremendously, however, and almost one-third of workers are unable to replace even 10% of their income loss. Moreover, predicted wealth holdings decline precipitously with realized unemployment durations, both absolutely and (especially) relative to actual income loss. This finding, together with the finding that individuals who are eligible for more generous UI draw down their wealth more slowly than do others during unemployment spells, suggests that UI benefit adequacy could be increased if the benefits were targeted to those with longer unemployment spells.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Gruber, 2001. "The Wealth of the Unemployed," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 55(1), pages 79-94, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:55:y:2001:i:1:p:79-94
    DOI: 10.1177/001979390105500105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. East, Chloe N. & Kuka, Elira, 2015. "Reexamining the consumption smoothing benefits of Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 32-50.
    2. Raj Chetty, 2005. "Why do Unemployment Benefits Raise Unemployment Durations? Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 11760, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Schwartz, J., 2015. "Optimal unemployment insurance: When search takes effort and money," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-17.
    4. Irina B. Grafova & Alan C. Monheit, 2019. "How does actual unemployment and the perceived risk of joblessness affect smoking behavior? Gender and intra-family effects," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 201-227, March.
    5. Jacob S. Hacker & Gregory A. Huber & Austin Nichols & Philipp Rehm & Mark Schlesinger & Rob Valletta & Stuart Craig, 2014. "The Economic Security Index: A New Measure for Research and Policy Analysis," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 60(S1), pages 5-32, May.
    6. Tali Regev, 2006. "Unemployment insurance and the uninsured," Working Paper Series 2006-48, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    7. Zhan, Min & Xiang, Xiaoling & Elliott, William, 2016. "Education loans and wealth building among young adults," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 67-75.
    8. Heinrich Hock & Walter Nicholson & Karen Needels & Joanne Lee & Priyanka Anand, "undated". "Additional Unemployment Compensation Benefits During the Great Recession: Recipients and Their Post-Claim Outcomes," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 881bfec473cb45498e8392657, Mathematica Policy Research.
    9. Zhan, Min & Xiang, Xiaoling, 2018. "Education loans and asset building among black and Hispanic young adults," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 121-127.
    10. Levander, Mats, 2019. "Financial Buffers, Unemployment Duration and Replacement Labor Income," Working Paper Series 379, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    11. Nakajima, Makoto, 2012. "A quantitative analysis of unemployment benefit extensions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(7), pages 686-702.
    12. Kristopher Gerardi & Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Lee E. Ohanian & Paul S. Willen, 2018. "Can’t Pay or Won’t Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(3), pages 1098-1131.

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