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Market Power with Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emission Standards in the Electricity Sector

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  • Yihsu Chen
  • Makoto Tanaka
  • Afzal S. Siddiqui

Abstract

The U.S. Clean Power Plan stipulates a state-specific performance-based CO2 emission standard, delegating states with considerable flexibility for using either a tradable performance-based or a mass-based permit program. This paper analyzes these two standards under imperfect competitive. We limit our attention to (1) short-run analyses and (2) a situation in which all states are subject to the same type of standard. We show that while the cross-subsidy inherent in the performance-based standard might effectively reduce power prices, it could also inflate energy consumption. A dominant firm with a relatively clean endowment under the performance-based standard would be able to manipulate the electricity market as well as to elevate permit prices, which might worsen market outcomes compared to its mass-based counterpart. On the other hand, the “cross-subsidy†could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare if the leader has a relatively dirty endowment.

Suggested Citation

  • Yihsu Chen & Makoto Tanaka & Afzal S. Siddiqui, 2018. "Market Power with Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emission Standards in the Electricity Sector," The Energy Journal, , vol. 39(6), pages 121-146, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:39:y:2018:i:6:p:121-146
    DOI: 10.5547/01956574.39.6.yche
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jan-Tjeerd Boom & Bouwe Dijkstra, 2009. "Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 44(1), pages 107-136, September.
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    3. Yihsu Chen & Chung-Li Tseng, 2011. "Inducing Clean Technology in the Electricity Sector: Tradable Permits or Carbon Tax Policies?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 169-174.
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    6. Beat Hintermann, 2017. "Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(1), pages 89-112, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Geng, Wenxin & Fan, Ying, 2024. "The effect of market power on the inter-temporal allocation of abatement under a rate-based emissions trading scheme," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    2. Hassanzadeh Moghimi, Farzad & Boomsma, Trine K. & Siddiqui, Afzal S., 2024. "Transmission planning in an imperfectly competitive power sector with environmental externalities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).

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