IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/enejou/v33y2012i4p160-186.html

Vertical Economies and the Costs of Separating Electricity Supply—A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature

Author

Listed:
  • Roland Meyer

Abstract

Motivated by the European movement towards a separation of electricity networks from the competitive functions generation and supply this paper reviews theoretical and empirical literature on vertical synergies in electricity supply. In the analysis a clear distinction is made between four different unbundling options leading to different forms and magnitudes of synergy losses. Apart from coordination economies a main source of scope economies seems to result from a market risk effect if generation and retail are separated. Accordingly, the European policy of network unbundling (either transmission or distribution) results in synergy losses between 2 and 8 percent due to coordination losses, while an unbundling option that includes a separation between retail and generation, as observed in some U.S. states, may lead to a permanent cost increase of 20 percent or more due to a significant risk increase. Keywords: Ownership unbundling, Vertical integration, Economies of scope http://dx.doi.org/10.5547/01956574.33.4.8

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Meyer, 2012. "Vertical Economies and the Costs of Separating Electricity Supply—A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature," The Energy Journal, , vol. 33(4), pages 160-186, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:33:y:2012:i:4:p:160-186
    DOI: 10.5547/01956574.33.4.8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.5547/01956574.33.4.8
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.5547/01956574.33.4.8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul L. Joskow, 2014. "Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 291-344, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Giovanni Fraquelli & Massimiliano Piacenza & Davide Vannoni, 2005. "Cost Savings From Generation and Distribution with an Application to Italian Electric Utilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 289-308, November.
    3. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    4. Arocena, Pablo, 2008. "Cost and quality gains from diversification and vertical integration in the electricity industry: A DEA approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 39-58, January.
    5. Faye Steiner, 2000. "Regulation, Industry Structure and Performance in the Electricity Supply Industry," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 238, OECD Publishing.
    6. William W. Cooper & Lawrence M. Seiford & Kaoru Tone, 2007. "Data Envelopment Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-0-387-45283-8, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paul Simshauser, 2025. "Are gas turbines 'bankable' in transitioning energy-only markets?," Working Papers EPRG2601, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:aen:journl:ej33-4-08 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Nardi, Paolo, 2012. "Transmission network unbundling and grid investments: Evidence from the UCTE countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 50-58.
    3. Sudhir Mahadeo Bobde & Makoto Tanaka, 2020. "Structural Reforms and Technical Efficiency in the Indian Electricity Distribution Sector," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 37(02), pages 1-36, March.
    4. Paul Nillesen & Michael G. Pollitt, 2019. "Ownership Unbundling of Electricity Distribution Networks," Working Papers EPRG 1905, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    5. Simona Bigerna & Maria Chiara D ’Errico & Paolo Polinori, 2019. "Environmental and Energy Efficiency of EU Electricity Industry: An Almost Spatial Two Stages DEA Approach," The Energy Journal, , vol. 40(1_suppl), pages 29-54, June.
    6. Sergio Jara-Díaz & Francisco Ramos-Real, 2011. "The effect of output specification on the optimal policy design for electric utilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 62-81, August.
    7. Miyuki Taniguchi, 2013. "The Impact of Liberalization on the Production of Electricity in Japan," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2012-027, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
    8. Goto, Mika & Inoue, Tomohiro & Sueyoshi, Toshiyuki, 2013. "Structural reform of Japanese electric power industry: Separation between generation and transmission & distribution," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 186-200.
    9. Brunekreeft, Gert, 2015. "Network unbundling and flawed coordination: Experience from the electricity sector," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 11-18.
    10. Roland Meyer, 2012. "Economies of scope in electricity supply and the costs of vertical separation for different unbundling scenarios," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 95-114, August.
    11. Fiorio, Carlo V. & Florio, Massimo, 2013. "Electricity prices and public ownership: Evidence from the EU15 over thirty years," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 222-232.
    12. Paul Simshauser, 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Working Papers EPRG2008, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    13. Simshauser, Paul, 2021. "Vertical integration, peaking plant commitments and the role of credit quality in energy-only markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    14. Simona Bigerna & Maria Chiara D’Errico & Paolo Polinori, 2019. "Environmental and Energy Efficiency of EU Electricity Industry: An Almost Spatial Two Stages DEA Approach," The Energy Journal, , vol. 40(1), pages 30-56, January.
    15. Mahdiloo, Mahdi & Ngwenyama, Ojelanki & Scheepers, Rens & Tamaddoni, Ali, 2018. "Managing emissions allowances of electricity producers to maximize CO2 abatement: DEA models for analyzing emissions and allocating emissions allowances," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 244-255.
    16. Norimichi Matsueda & Jun’Ichi Miki, 2017. "Contracting-Out Of Household Waste Collection Services In Japan," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 65(02), pages 443-455, May.
    17. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    18. Franz R. Hahn, 2007. "Determinants of Bank Efficiency in Europe. Assessing Bank Performance Across Markets," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 31499.
    19. Alperovych, Yan & Hübner, Georges & Lobet, Fabrice, 2015. "How does governmental versus private venture capital backing affect a firm's efficiency? Evidence from Belgium," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 508-525.
    20. Costa, Marcelo Azevedo & Lopes, Ana Lúcia Miranda & de Pinho Matos, Giordano Bruno Braz, 2015. "Statistical evaluation of Data Envelopment Analysis versus COLS Cobb–Douglas benchmarking models for the 2011 Brazilian tariff revision," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 47-60.
    21. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:33:y:2012:i:4:p:160-186. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.