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European unilateralism and involuntary burden-sharing in global climate politics: A public opinion perspective from the other side

Author

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  • Thomas Bernauer
  • Robert Gampfer
  • Aya Kachi

Abstract

Powerful political actors in the international system quite frequently adopt unilateral policies whose implications extend beyond their respective borders. Examples include financial market regulation as well as taxation, trade and environmental policies. They do so to avoid lowest common-denominator outcomes in areas where they desire more ambitious international policies, and to motivate or coerce other countries to shoulder a part of the burden associated with problem solving. This article explores whether and how such unilateralism affects public opinion in other countries, arguing that such analysis can point to external constraints on unilateralism and is worthwhile also for normative reasons. Empirically, we examine the effect of a major unilateral European Union (EU) climate policy initiative, which regulates emissions from aircraft, on public opinion in India and the United States, the two largest democracies outside the EU. Based on survey experiments, we study the effects of cost and sovereignty considerations on people’s evaluation of the EU’s new policy. The results show that both types of concern play a significant role and may act as a constraint on unilateral European climate policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Bernauer & Robert Gampfer & Aya Kachi, 2014. "European unilateralism and involuntary burden-sharing in global climate politics: A public opinion perspective from the other side," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 132-151, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:15:y:2014:i:1:p:132-151
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116513496878
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kathleen E. Powers & Joshua D. Kertzer & Deborah J. Brooks & Stephen G. Brooks, 2022. "What’s Fair in International Politics? Equity, Equality, and Foreign Policy Attitudes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(2), pages 217-245, February.
    2. Robert Gampfer, 2016. "Minilateralism or the UNFCCC? The Political Feasibility of Climate Clubs," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 16(3), pages 62-88, August.
    3. Kachi, Aya & Bernauer, Thomas & Gampfer, Robert, 2015. "Climate policy in hard times: Are the pessimists right?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 227-241.
    4. Brilé Anderson & Thomas Bernauer & Stefano Balietti, 2017. "Effects of fairness principles on willingness to pay for climate change mitigation," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 447-461, June.
    5. Stine Aakre, 2016. "The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 145-159, February.

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