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The IMF's Return to Latin America: Build forward Better?

Author

Listed:
  • Breczko, Agata

    (Faculty of Political and Social Sciences (FCPyS) and National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM))

  • Zavaleta Hernández, Sandra Kanety

    (Center of International Relations (CRI), Faculty of Political and Social Sciences (FCPyS) and National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM))

Abstract

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), after over a decade of estrangement from several Latin American countries due to its socially costly interventions in the 1980s and 1990s, is now making a return under several lending modalities. This renewed engagement is occurring after the IMF's own internal transformation and rebranding. The critical question is whether the prescribed policies upon the IMF’s return will deviate from historical patterns. To address this, we undertake a comprehensive analysis, juxtaposing the Fund's specific conditions (praxis) with its broader policy recommendations (rhetoric) in recent interventions, and employing text mining analysis and a customized dictionary tailored to IMF technocratic discourse. Findings reveal a significant evolution in policy advice, introducing socially friendly approaches while retaining orthodox measures. This study contributes to the broader discussion on IMF continuity, highlighting nuanced shifts and potential inconsistencies between IMF discourse and practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Breczko, Agata & Zavaleta Hernández, Sandra Kanety, 2024. "The IMF's Return to Latin America: Build forward Better?," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 77(1), pages 37-62.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:ecoint:0962
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IMF; Conditionality; Discourse; Text-Mining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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