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Déflation et politique monétaire

  • St-Amant, Pierre

    (Banque du Canada)

  • Tessier, David

    (Université du Québec en Outaouais)

This paper discusses policies that monetary policy authorities could implement in response to a generalized and persistent decline in goods and services prices. The authors argue that in such situation the priority should be to defend the credibility of monetary policy. They differentiate between two types of credibility: that concerning the authorities’ intention to reach their target and that concerning the authorities’ capacity to reach the target. They then review a few instruments that could strengthen these two types of credibility. Their conclusion is that monetary policy authorities would have powerful tools at their disposal to escape deflation. Persistent and repeated policy errors would be needed for deflation to persist. Dans ce texte, les auteurs traitent des politiques que les autorités monétaires pourraient adopter pour mettre fin à une baisse généralisée des prix des biens et des services. Ils soutiennent que la priorité doit être d’asseoir la crédibilité de la politique monétaire. Ils distinguent deux types de crédibilité : celle relative à l’intention des autorités d’atteindre une cible de stabilité des prix et celle relative à leur capacité d’atteindre cette cible. Ils passent en revue quelques instruments susceptibles de renforcer ces deux types de crédibilité. Leur conclusion est que les autorités monétaires disposeraient de moyens puissants, bien que difficiles à doser, pour éliminer la déflation. Il faudrait des erreurs de politique persistantes et répétées pour qu’une déflation perdure.

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Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 84 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (septembre)
Pages: 307-323

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:84:y:2008:i:3:p:307-323
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  1. St-Amant, Pierre & Tessier, David, 1998. "Résultats empiriques multi-pays relatifs à l'impact des cibles d'inflation sur la crédibilité de la politique monétaire," Staff Working Papers 98-23, Bank of Canada.
  2. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
  3. Svensson, Lars-E-O, 2001. "The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 19(S1), pages 277-312, February.
  4. Gregor W. Smith, 2006. "The spectre of deflation: a review of empirical evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1041-1072, November.
  5. Alan Auerbach & Maurice Obstfeld, 2004. "The Case for Open-Market Purchases in a Liquidity Trap," Macroeconomics 0407009, EconWPA.
  6. Goodfriend, Marvin, 2000. "Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest Rate Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 1007-35, November.
  7. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2003. "Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and Others," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 145-166, Fall.
  8. Andrew Filardo & Claudio E. V. Borio, 2004. "Back to the future? Assessing the deflation record," BIS Working Papers 152, Bank for International Settlements.
  9. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, 03.
  10. Michael D. Bordo & John Landon Lane & Angela Redish, 2004. "Good versus Bad Deflation: Lessons from the Gold Standard Era," NBER Working Papers 10329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Policy Options in a Liquidity Trap," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 76-79, May.
  12. David Amirault & Brian O'Reilly, 2001. "The Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates: How Important Is It?," Staff Working Papers 01-6, Bank of Canada.
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