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Sous-investissement et suppression d’effectifs : vers une réduction des coûts d’agence

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  • Sentis, Patrick

    (GESEM-Finance, Université Montpellier I)

Abstract

This paper argues that the agency costs of under-investment could be eliminated when the levered firm takes the possibility to reduce its employees. We focus on the effect of employees reductions on wealth of stakeholders in the unlevered and levered firms. Bondholders and employees only benefit from these operations. It is shown that an optimal capital structure exists and that the levered firm value is more than the unlevered firm value. Cet article montre que la possibilité pour une firme endettée de réduire ses effectifs permet de supprimer les situations de sous-investissement et les coûts d’agence qui leurs sont liés. L’influence de la possibilité de réduire les effectifs sur la richesse des parties prenantes de l’entreprise est étudiée. Seuls les créanciers et les travailleurs profitent de la politique de réduction d’effectifs. La valeur des actions demeure inchangée. Enfin, dans le modèle, une structure du capital optimale existe et la valeur de l’entreprise endettée apparaît supérieure à celle de l’entreprise sans dette.

Suggested Citation

  • Sentis, Patrick, 2001. "Sous-investissement et suppression d’effectifs : vers une réduction des coûts d’agence," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(1), pages 5-26, mars.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:77:y:2001:i:1:p:5-26
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