IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed016/1254.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Credit and Firm-Level Volatility of Employment

Author

Listed:
  • Vincenzo Quadrini

    (USC)

Abstract

We study a firm dynamics model where access to credit improves the bargaining position of firms with workers and increases the incentive to hire. To evaluate the importance of the bargaining channel for the hiring decisions of firms, we estimate the model structurally using data from Compustat and Capital IQ. We find that the bargaining channel contributes to about 5.7% of variation in firm-level employment. We also evaluate the contribution of different types of firm-level shocks to employment volatility and find that credit shocks contribute to about 8%, revenue shocks to 48% and job separation shocks to 44%.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincenzo Quadrini, 2016. "Credit and Firm-Level Volatility of Employment," 2016 Meeting Papers 1254, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed016:1254
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2016/paper_1254.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lee, Bong-Soo & Ingram, Beth Fisher, 1991. "Simulation estimation of time-series models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2-3), pages 197-205, February.
    2. Tommaso Monacelli & Vincenzo Quadrini & Antonella Trigari, 2011. "Financial Markets and Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 17389, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Filippo Ippolito & Ander Perez, 2012. "Credit Lines: The Other Side of Corporate Liquidity," Working Papers 618, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Perotti, Enrico C & Spier, Kathryn E, 1993. "Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1131-1141, December.
    5. David A. Matsa, 2010. "Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1197-1232, June.
    6. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    7. Christopher A. Hennessy & Toni M. Whited, 2005. "Debt Dynamics," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1129-1165, June.
    8. Urban Jermann & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2012. "Erratum: Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 1186-1186, April.
    9. Andrea L. Eisfeldt & Dimitris Papanikolaou, 2013. "Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(4), pages 1365-1406, August.
    10. Urban Jermann & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2012. "Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 238-271, February.
    11. Stephen G. Bronars & Donald R. Deere, 1991. "The Threat of Unionization, the Use of Debt, and the Preservation of Shareholder Wealth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 231-254.
    12. Klasa, Sandy & Maxwell, William F. & Ortiz-Molina, Hernán, 2009. "The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in collective bargaining with labor unions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 421-442, June.
    13. David J. Denis & Stephen B. McKeon, 2012. "Debt Financing and Financial Flexibility Evidence from Proactive Leverage Increases," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(6), pages 1897-1929.
    14. Amir Sufi, 2009. "Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(3), pages 1057-1088, March.
    15. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Sengupta, Kunal, 1993. "Sunk Investment, Bargaining and Choice of Capital Structure," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 203-220, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed016:1254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.