Les marchés imparfaits dans la théorie macroéconomique
This essay will survey a variety of macroeconomic situations in which private information, indivisibilities, and other factors inhibit either the development of complete financial markets or the free participation of individual households in all existing markets. Among the examples developed in some detail are the dynamic inefficiency of competitive equilibrium, credit rationing and its consequences, cash-in-advance constraints and the demand for money, implicit contracts and unemployment, and the accumulation of human capital. Cet essai considérera une variété de situations macroéconomiques où l’information privée, les indivisibilités et d’autres facteurs empêchent soit le développement de marchés financiers complets soit la libre participation des ménages aux marchés existants. Parmi les exemples présentés, mentionnons l’inefficacité dynamique de l’équilibre concurrentiel, le rationnement du crédit, les contraintes de liquidité et la demande de monnaie, les contrats implicites et le chômage, ainsi que l’accumulation du capital humain.
Volume (Year): 63 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (décembre)
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- Zeldes, Stephen P, 1989.
"Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation,"
Journal of Political Economy,
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