IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rei/ecoins/v9y2007i17p153-181.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

El modelo de Skaperdas y Syropoulos

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Raffo López

    () (Universidad ICESI)

Abstract

This paper offers a detailed presentation of the Skaperdas and Syropoulos model; one of the main models of the theory of conflict and state emergence. First, it describes the model’s Nash equilibrium and the relevant effects of comparative analysis. And second, from a new interpretation of the equilibrium and comparisons with other similar models, the paper concludes that it constitutes the most general analytical framework in the subject, which can be understood as the foundations for a general theory of conflict and state emergence.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Raffo López, 2007. "El modelo de Skaperdas y Syropoulos," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(17), pages 153-181, July-Dece.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:9:y:2007:i:17:p:153-181
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/lraffo17.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herschel I. Grossman, 2013. "Choosing Between Peace and War," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 765-783, November.
    2. Herschel Grossman, 2004. "Peace and War in Territorial Disputes," Working Papers 2004-07, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Mathias Thoenig, 2008. "Make Trade Not War?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 865-900.
    4. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    5. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1993. "Gangs as Primitive States," Papers 92-93-02, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    conflict; war; state emergence; Nash equilibriums;

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:9:y:2007:i:17:p:153-181. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paola Rodríguez). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/feextco.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.