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Corrupción y captura en la regulación de los servicios públicos

Author

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  • Frédéric Boehm

    () (Berlin University of Technology)

Abstract

Regulation plays a key part in public service reforms. However, corruption and the risk of capture may undermine the purposes of these reforms. Both cost and incentive based regulations carry corruption and capture risks. This document shows that capture is a minor problem compared with market failures in different sectors, and thus proposes reforms to generate transparency and accountability in the regulatory processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Boehm, 2005. "Corrupción y captura en la regulación de los servicios públicos," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 7(13), pages 245-263, July-Dece.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:7:y:2005:i:13:p:245-263
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/fboehm13.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October.
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    3. David Martimort, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 929-947.
    4. Manzetti, Luigi, 1999. "Privatization South American Style," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198294665.
    5. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-1023, October.
    6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    7. Ugaz, Cecilia, 2001. "A Public Goods Approach to Regulation of Utilities," WIDER Working Paper Series 009, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
    9. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    10. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
    11. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
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    13. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    14. Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
    15. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    16. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jahir Alexander Gutiérrez Ossa & Edgar Varela Barrios, 2013. "Estructura de Prestación de los servicios públicos domiciliarios (SPD) de energía eléctrica en Bogotá y la Costa Atlántica," REVISTA FINANZAS Y POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE COLOMBIA, vol. 5(2), pages 115-140, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; capture; regulation; public services;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

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