Corrupción y captura en la regulación de los servicios públicos
Regulation plays a key part in public service reforms. However, corruption and the risk of capture may undermine the purposes of these reforms. Both cost and incentive based regulations carry corruption and capture risks. This document shows that capture is a minor problem compared with market failures in different sectors, and thus proposes reforms to generate transparency and accountability in the regulatory processes.
Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
Issue (Month): 13 (July-December)
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