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Rentas monopolísticas en el sistema de precios

Author

Listed:
  • Homero Cuevas

    (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

Abstract

This paper seeks to point out and to correct some mistakes of the conventional theory of imperfect competition based on partial equilibrium analysis. It extends to imperfect competition the classical model of general equilibrium, signaling the interconnections between individual prices and between these and macroeconomic aggregates.

Suggested Citation

  • Homero Cuevas, 1999. "Rentas monopolísticas en el sistema de precios," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 89-97, July-dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:1:y:1999:i:1:p:89-97
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/hcuevas1.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Schwartzman, 1960. "The Burden of Monopoly," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68, pages 627-627.
    2. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Ivan Gonzalez & Mauricio Perez Salazar, 2019. "Mercados y Bienestar. Ensayos en memoria de homero cuevas," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Economía, number 79, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monopolistic rents; imperfect competition; price system; general equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D59 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Other
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other

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