Regulacion y fallas
Government plays a necessary role in keeping markets working efficiently and fairly. Market failures –situations in which the invisible hand does not make everyone better off– are among the oldest and most universally accepted justifications for regulation. However, incidents of market failure are more pervasive than recognized and underappreciated. Well-designed regulatory interventions can often correct these market failures.
Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
Issue (Month): 23 (July-December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Cra. 1 No. 12-68 Casa de las Mandolinas|
Phone: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1307
Fax: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1304
Web page: http://www.economiainstitucional.com
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-264.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(2), pages 133-152, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:12:y:2010:i:23:p:13-28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paola Rodríguez)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.