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Protection de l'emploi et performance du marché du travail. Commentaire de Bertrand Martinot

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  • Olivier L'Haridon
  • Franck Malherbet

Abstract

[eng] Job protection has often been blamed as a source of the poor employment performance of many European countries. Since the beginning of the 90s, much attention has been devoted to the theoretical and the empirical analysis of the consequences of labor market regulation on labor market performance. In this paper, we summarize these results by considering three main indicators of job protection: administrative firing costs, notice periods and short-term contracts. We study the effects of job protection policies thanks to an equilibrium matching model calibrated on the French labor market. Our results suggest that administrative firing costs and notice periods have no significant effect on the unemployment rate. However these instruments profoundly modify the composition of unemployment as well as labor market dynamics. Ultimately, we consider the potential employment protection effect of an US based experience rated scheme on the French labor market. To a certain extent, this system is here proven to improve labor market performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier L'Haridon & Franck Malherbet, 2003. "Protection de l'emploi et performance du marché du travail. Commentaire de Bertrand Martinot," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 17(4), pages 21-83.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2003_num_17_4_1472
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2003.1472
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2003.1472
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cahuc, Pierre & Malherbet, Franck, 2004. "Unemployment compensation finance and labor market rigidity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 481-501, March.
    2. Yu‐Fu Chen & Dennis Snower & Gylfi Zoega, 2003. "Labour‐market Institutions and Macroeconomic Shocks," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 17(2), pages 247-270, June.
    3. Goux, Dominique & Maurin, Eric & Pauchet, Marianne, 2001. "Fixed-term contracts and the dynamics of labour demand," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 533-552, March.
    4. Olivier L'Haridon & Franck Malherbet, 2002. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations," Working Papers 2002-48, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier L’Haridon & Franck Malherbet, 2009. "Politiques du marché du travail et négociations par branches d'activité dans un modèle d'appariement," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 75(2), pages 183-228.

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