Réformes de la fiscalité du capital en Europe
[fre] La mobilité du capital, notamment au sein de l'Union européenne, semble avoir motivé de nombreuses réformes de la fiscalité du capital en Europe, parce que son renforcement limiterait les possibilités des Etats de taxer ce facteur mobile. Pourtant, aucune baisse généralisée des taux effectifs de taxation du capital, un des principaux signes qui devraient traduire une forte « concurrence fiscale », n'est observée. Cet article propose un panorama d'autres motivations, domestiques et non internationales, des réformes fiscales. Malgré tout, l'analyse des effets de la mobilité croissante du capital, s'ils doivent être nuancés, amène à considérer les possibilités de coordination des politiques fiscales. L'examen des scénarios récemment proposés par la Commission européenne conduit en particulier à considérer un impôt européen sur les entreprises. [eng] Capital mobility, especially across European countries, may have been the main rationale for many capital tax reforms in Europe since a more mobile capital should limit States' ability to tax capital. Yet, no generalized decrease in effective tax rates on capital has been observed even though such a decrease would be the main sign of « tax competition ». In this article, domestic, in addition to international, justifications for capital tax reforms are outlined. Nevertheless, even qualified, the effects of a higher capital mobility suggest that ways to coordinate tax policy should be considered. By analyzing the European Commission's recent proposals, this article also considers a European corporate tax.
Volume (Year): 16 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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