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Formation en entreprise et débauchage de main d'oeuvre aux Etats-Unis : un modèle dynamique d'action collective


  • Eve Caroli
  • Natalie Glance
  • Bernardo Huberman


[fre] Nous proposons, dans cet article, un modèle dynamique d'action collective permettant d'étudier les conditions d'émergence d'un système de formation en entreprise dans l'économie américaine. Ce type de formation comporte certaines des caractéristiques d'un bien collectif et sa production soulève, de ce fait, un pro­blème de coordination de type dilemme du prisonnier à n joueurs. Nous modéli-sons celui-ci à l'aide d'un formalisme emprunté à la mécanique statistique et en supposant les entreprises fortement hétérogènes. Nous montrons qu'un équilibre à haut niveau de formation en entreprise peut en théorie émerger spontanément. Cela s'avère cependant impossible pour des valeurs des paramètres caractéristi­ques de l'économie américaine. [eng] Training and labor poaching in the U.S : a dynamical model of collective action. . This article presents a dynamical model of collective action which provides a framework for studying whether the American economy may ever spontaneously shift towards a high-training equilibrium in the absence of any institutional intervention. In-firm training has some of the characteristics of a collective good and its production thus raises a pro­blem of coordination, very close to a n-player prisoner's dilemma. We modelize this pro­blem, borrowing from statistical physics and assuming that firms are heterogeneous. We show that, in theory, a high-training equilibrium may eventually emerge, in the long run. However, this proves impossible in the United-States given the values of the parameters for the American economy.

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  • Eve Caroli & Natalie Glance & Bernardo Huberman, 1995. "Formation en entreprise et débauchage de main d'oeuvre aux Etats-Unis : un modèle dynamique d'action collective," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 807-816.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_3_409692
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409692

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. Bishop, J., 1993. "Underinvestment in Employer Training: Is a Mandate the Answer," Papers 93-02, Cornell - Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies.
    3. Boyer, Robert & Orlean, Andre, 1992. "How Do Conventions Evolve?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 165-177, October.
    4. Lynch, Lisa M, 1993. "The Economics of Youth Training in the United States," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(420), pages 1292-1302, September.
    5. Finegold, David & Soskice, David, 1988. "The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 21-53, Autumn.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1975. "Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, Second Edition," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck75-1.
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