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Les transformations des conventions salariales entre théorie et histoire : d'Henry Ford au fordisme


  • Robert Boyer
  • André Orléan


[fre] Les transformations des conventions salariales entre théorie et histoire. D'Henry Ford au fordisme. . Les outils de la théorie des jeux et l'économie des conventions permettent un éclairage nouveau concernant une question centrale pour les approches de la régulation : comment aux États-Unis a émergé la norme salariale fordienne ? Un modèle simple suggère l'absence de mécanismes endogènes assurant une telle émergence. Une analyse de la politique des 5 $ par jour initiée par l'entreprise Ford confirme la variété et la multiplicité des obstacles rencontrés : impossibilité d'internalisation complète de leurs effets bénéfiques, aspects partiellement contradictoires de la stratégie d'américanisation, essor d'acteurs collectifs (syndicats, État, ...) et de conventions collectives, incapacité d'une entreprise à modifier le mode de régulation global et interdépendance des diverses conventions associées au fordisme. Apparaît un double paradoxe : le fordisme américain sera à l'opposé du projet d'Henry Ford alors que le toyotisme en constituera, au Japon, une application inintentionnelle mais fidèle. [eng] The transformations of wage systems, between economic theory and history. . Game theory and the economics of conventions are used in order to enlighten a crucial issue for the " regulation " approach : how has emerged the fordist wage norm in the United States ? A simple model suggests the absence of any endogeneous mechanisms providing such a transition. An historical analysis of the five dollars day policy by Henry Ford confirms the multiplicity of the obstacles to its diffusion : a very partial internalisation by the firm of the related benefits, the contradictory implications of americanism, the rise of collective actors and collective agreements, the unability of any firm, however large, to alter macroeconomic equilibrium and the complementarities between the various conventions associated with fordism. A twofold paradox cornes out : truly existing american fordism will be at odds with the genuine project of Henry Ford, whereas toyotism will be a very precise but inintentional implementation of these ideas in Japan.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Boyer & André Orléan, 1991. "Les transformations des conventions salariales entre théorie et histoire : d'Henry Ford au fordisme," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(2), pages 233-272.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1991_num_42_2_409277
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1991.409277

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Boyer, Tristan, 2002. "Gouvernement d'entreprise et décisions d'emploi
      [Corporate Governance and employment decisions]
      ," MPRA Paper 10287, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Marc Amblard, 2000. "La Theorie Des Conventions : Une Approche Renouvelee Du Modele Comptable ?," Post-Print halshs-00587419, HAL.
    3. Pascal Ughetto, 2000. "Problématiques hétérodoxes du travail en économie : quel avenir," Post-Print halshs-00327617, HAL.
    4. Robert Boyer & André Orléan, 1995. "Stabilité de la coopération dans les jeux évolutionnistes stochastiques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 797-806.
    5. Nathalie Ferreira, 2006. "Eléments theoriques pour une nouvelle analyse economique de l'entreprise autogérée (About on an economic analysis for the selfmanaged entreprise)," Working Papers 138, Laboratoire de Recherche sur l'Industrie et l'Innovation. ULCO / Research Unit on Industry and Innovation.
    6. Bernard Baudry, 1992. "Contrat, autorité et confiance. La relation de sous-traitance est-elle assimilable à la relation d'emploi ?," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(5), pages 871-894.
    7. Segura, André, 1996. "Les nouveaux départs de l’économie politique," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 72(2), pages 173-213, juin.
    8. Boyer, Robert, 2012. "Diversité et évolution des capitalismes en Amérique latine. De la régulation économique au politique," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 11.
    9. Jérome VICENTE (GRES-LEREPS), 2003. "From interaction economics to economic geography : theories and evidences (In French)," Cahiers du GRES (2002-2009) 2003-02, Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales.
    10. Sandrine DARAUT (GRES-LEREPS), 2003. "The Organizational Information System (OIS), object and medium of learning (In French)," Cahiers du GRES (2002-2009) 2003-01, Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales.

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