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Les transformations des conventions salariales entre théorie et histoire : d'Henry Ford au fordisme

  • Robert Boyer
  • André Orléan

[fre] Les transformations des conventions salariales entre théorie et histoire. D'Henry Ford au fordisme Les outils de la théorie des jeux et l'économie des conventions permettent un éclairage nouveau concernant une question centrale pour les approches de la régulation : comment aux États-Unis a émergé la norme salariale fordienne ? Un modèle simple suggère l'absence de mécanismes endogènes assurant une telle émergence. Une analyse de la politique des 5 $ par jour initiée par l'entreprise Ford confirme la variété et la multiplicité des obstacles rencontrés : impossibilité d'internalisation complète de leurs effets bénéfiques, aspects partiellement contradictoires de la stratégie d'américanisation, essor d'acteurs collectifs (syndicats, État, ...) et de conventions collectives, incapacité d'une entreprise à modifier le mode de régulation global et interdépendance des diverses conventions associées au fordisme. Apparaît un double paradoxe : le fordisme américain sera à l'opposé du projet d'Henry Ford alors que le toyotisme en constituera, au Japon, une application inintentionnelle mais fidèle. [eng] The transformations of wage systems, between economic theory and history Game theory and the economics of conventions are used in order to enlighten a crucial issue for the " regulation " approach : how has emerged the fordist wage norm in the United States ? A simple model suggests the absence of any endogeneous mechanisms providing such a transition. An historical analysis of the five dollars day policy by Henry Ford confirms the multiplicity of the obstacles to its diffusion : a very partial internalisation by the firm of the related benefits, the contradictory implications of americanism, the rise of collective actors and collective agreements, the unability of any firm, however large, to alter macroeconomic equilibrium and the complementarities between the various conventions associated with fordism. A twofold paradox cornes out : truly existing american fordism will be at odds with the genuine project of Henry Ford, whereas toyotism will be a very precise but inintentional implementation of these ideas in Japan.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/reco.1991.409277
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1991_num_42_2_409277
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 42 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 233-272

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1991_num_42_2_409277
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1991.409277
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/reco

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