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Le discrédit des banques et l’impact des réformes au Japon

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  • Laurence Loulmet

Abstract

[fre] Cet article présente l'évolution du secteur bancaire japonais à partir d'une approche capitalistique du gouvernement d'entreprise et tente de savoir si les banques discréditées après la bulle spéculative ne seraient pas aujourd'hui réhabilitées. La structure capitalistique des keiretsu conforte le pouvoir des banques. Toutefois, les évolutions ne s'orientent pas réellement vers la remise en cause de cette architecture mais transparaissent au niveau de nouvelles structures financières, telles les holdings bancaires. Par ailleurs, le discrédit des banques affectées par le sauvetage des petits établissements se justifie par la présence de risque moral et par un déficit de monitoring ex ante des équipes dirigeantes. La structure de holding pourrait remédier à ces deux problèmes en instaurant une transparence accrue des comptes et une surveillance plus étroite des banques par la présence d'investisseurs institutionnels actifs dans la recherche de rentabilité financière. . Classification JEL : G32, G34 [eng] The evolution and discredit of Japanese banks . This article shows the evolution of Japanese banks from a capitalistic perspective of corporate governance and if they can continue today to have the main role in the financial system. First, the capital holding model, financial keiretsu, generates stronger power for banks. The financial keiretsu is not running under transformation but on the contrary the main banks reconcentrate their activities throughout holding companies structures in order to be able to do what they can't do in keiretsu. The second point explains the discredit of the Japanese banks. The confusion between government circles and leading main bank's teams closely connected explains the lack of monitoring from the main banks towards the small interlocked one's. Now, with institutional investors as stakeholders in the holding company, this structure is suited for more transparency and disclosure. With this structure the banks can reinforce their power, avoid the lack of monitoring and also mitigate the risk of moral hazard. . JEL classification : G32, G34

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Loulmet, 2004. "Le discrédit des banques et l’impact des réformes au Japon," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 75(2), pages 263-290.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2004_num_75_2_4906
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2004.4906
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2004.4906
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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