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Diffusion du savoir et incitation à l'innovation : le rôle des accords de coopération en recherche et développement

Listed author(s):
  • David Encaoua
  • Pierre Mohnen
  • Emmanuel Duguet
  • Bruno Crépon

[spa] Difusiôn del saber e incitation a la innovation : el papel de los convenios de cooperation en En el âmbito de la economfa del sector investigation y desarrollo existe un dilema consabido entre difusiôn del saber e incitation a la investigation. Cuando, por un lado, el saber suele poseer una dimension de bien pûblico que nos Ileva a desear su mayor difusiôn, la producciôn privada del mismo, por otro lado, necesita un sistema de incitaciones que permita la protection de las rentas a sacar de su explotaciôn. Un amplio abanico de intrumentos ex post de polftica de investigation, que incluyen las patentes y los acuerdos de licencia, se practice en la mayor parte de las sociedades industrializadas. Dichos instrumentes se prestan a unas modalidades de aplicatiôn bastante diferenciadas entre los pafses y a unos arbitrajes especfficos entre incitation a la innovation y difusiôn del saber. investigation y desarrollo. Los convenios de cooperation entre empresas se ven justificados, por el anâlisis econômico, como un medio de estimular la inversion en investigation y desarrollo y de promover el progreso técnico de una nation. Al adoptar diferentes formas de organizaciôn, estos convenios se caracterizan ante todo por ser ex ante, o sea efectuados antes de que se inicie la investigaciôn. En fuerte crecimiento en un periodo reciente, son convenios internationales por la mayor parte y afectan sobre todo los sectores de alta tecnologfa. Favorable desde muy temprano al desarrollo de semejantes convenios entre empresas, la Comisiôn europea se entrega sin embargo a un delicado arbitraje entre el afân de promover unos convenios que favorezcan el progreso técnico y econômico y el acatamiento de las reglas de competencia en los mercados europeos. [fre] Diffusion du savoir et incitation à l'innovation : le rôle des accords de coopération en recherche et développement Dans le domaine de l'économie de la recherche et développement, un dilemme classique existe entre diffusion du savoir et incitation à la recherche. Alors que le savoir possède, en général, une dimension de bien public qui conduit a souhaiter sa plus large diffusion, la production privée de ce savoir nécessite un système d'incitations permettant la protection des revenus potentiels issus de son exploitation. Une large gamme d'instruments ex post de politique de recherche et développement, incluant les brevets et les accords de licence, a ainsi été mise en pratique dans la plupart des sociétés industrialisées. Ces instruments donnent lieu à des modalités d'application relativement différenciées entre pays et a des arbitrages spécifiques entre incitation à l'innovation et diffusion du savoir. Les accords de coopération entre entreprises sont également justifiés sur le plan de l'analyse économique comme un moyen de favoriser l'investissement en recherche et développement et de promouvoir le progrès technique d'une nation. Pouvant prendre différentes formes organi- sationnelles, ces accords ont la principale caractéristique d'être ex ante, c'est-à-dire réalisés avant que la recherche ne soit entreprise. En forte croissance sur la période récente, ils sont, pour leur plus grande part, internationaux et concernent surtout les secteurs de haute technologie. Très tôt favorable au développement de tels accords entre entreprises, la Commission européenne poursuit, cependant, un difficile arbitrage entre le souci de promouvoir des accords favorables au progrès technique et économique et le respect des règles concurrentielles sur les marchés européens. [eng] Spreading Knowledge and Encouraging Innovation : The Role of Co-operation Agreements in Research and Development There is a classic dilemma in research and development economics between spreading knowledge and encouraging innovation. Although knowledge generally has a public good aspect that makes its wider circulation desirable, the private production of this knowledge requires a system of incentives to protect the potential income resulting from its use. A wide range of ex-post research and development policy instruments, including patents and licensing agreements, has thus been put into use in the majority of industrialized companies. These instruments give rise to relatively different application methods in the various countries and to specific arbitration between encouraging innovation and spreading knowledge. Co-operation agreements between firms are also justified from the point of view of economic analysis, as they form a way of fostering investment in research and development and furthering a nation's technological progress. Although these agreements may have different organizational forms, the main feature of all of them is that they are ex ante, i.e. they are concluded before the research is undertaken. There has recently been a sharp rise in these agreements, which are primarily international and concern mainly the high-technology sectors. The European Commission has been quick to favour the development of such agreements between firms, but is facing some delicate arbitration between the concern for developing agreements to further technological and economic progress and the respect for competitive rules on the European markets. [ger] Verbreitung von Wissen und Anreiz zur Innovation: die Rolle der Kooperationsvereinbarungen im Bereich von Forschung und Entwicklung Im Bereich der Forschungs- und Entwicklungsôkonomie besteht ein klassisches Dilemma zwischen Wissensver- breitung und Forschungsanreiz. Wâhrend das Wissen allgemein eine Art ôffentliches Gut darstellt, das es môglichst umfassend zu verbreiten gilt, benôtigt die private Schaffung dieses Wissens ein System von Anreizen, das einen Schutz der môglichen Einkûnfte aus seiner Verwertung ermôglicht. In den meisten Industriege- sellschaften ist deshalb eine groBe Palette an Ex-Post- Instrumenten in der Forschungs- und Entwicklungspolitik geschaffen worden, zu denen auch die Patente und LJzenz- vereinbarungen gehôren. Dièse Instrumente fûhren zu Anwendungsmodalitâten, die zwischen den einzelnen Lândern relativ differenziert sind, und erfordern besonde- re Arbitrationen zwischen Innovationsanreiz und Wissens- verbreitung. In wirtschaftsanalytischer Hinsicht sind die Kooperationsvereinbarungen zwischen den Untemehmen als einMittel zur Unterstûtzung der Investition in Forschung und Entwicklung sowie zur Fôrderung des technischen Fortschrittes einer Nation ebenfalls gerechtfertigt. Dièse Kooperationsvereinbarungen, die verschiedene Organi- sationsformen annehmen kônnen, zeichnen sich vor allem durch ihren Ex-ante-Charakter aus, das heiBt, daB sie vor Beginn der Forschungstâtigkeit abgeschlos- sen werden. Solche Vereinbarungen, die sich in der jûngsten Zeit sehr verbreitet haben, werden zum groBen Teil auf internationaler Ebene abgeschlossen und be- treffen insbesondere die Sektoren der Hochtechnolo- gie. Die Europâische Kommission, die den AbschluB solcher Vereinbarungen zwischen den Unter- nehmen sehr unterstûtzt, muB jedoch einen recht schwierigen KompromiB finden zwischen einerseits der Fôrderung von Vereinbarungen, die dem technischen und wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt dienen,.und andererseits der Einhaltung der Wettbewerbsregeln auf den europâischen Mârkten.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/estat.1993.5766
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/estat_0336-1454_1993_num_266_1_5766
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Economie et statistique.

Volume (Year): 266 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 47-63

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1993_num_266_1_5766
Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1993.5766
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/estat

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  1. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1985. "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 70-83, Spring.
  2. Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 1990. "Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 131-146, Spring.
  3. Paul Klemperer, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring.
  4. Patrizio Bianchi, 1991. "Politique antitrust et politique de la concurrence dans le contexte européen (première partie)," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 7-26.
  5. Janusz A. Ordover, 1991. "A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
  6. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 822-841, August.
  7. Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
  8. Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, 1985. "Licensing in the Theory of Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 237-252, Summer.
  9. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 1988. "Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 123-137, Spring.
  10. Grossman, Gene M & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 315-337, Fall.
  11. Glenn C. Loury, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
  12. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-526, June.
  13. William James Adams & Bruno Crépon & David Encaoua, 1992. "Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 102(1), pages 27-36.
  14. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological Progress," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(0), pages 146-165, Suppl. No.
  15. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-589.
  16. Crampes, Claude, 1986. "Les inconvénients d’un dépôt de brevet pour une entreprise innovatrice," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(4), pages 521-534, décembre.
  17. Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, 1988. ""Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 221-234, Summer.
  18. Patrizio Bianchi, 1992. "Politique antitrust et politique de la concurrence dans le contexte européen - Seconde partie : les politiques anti-trust aux États-Unis et en Europe," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 60(1), pages 7-28.
  19. Jorde, Thomas M & Teece, David J, 1990. "Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 75-96, Summer.
  20. Michael L. Katz, 1986. "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 527-543, Winter.
  21. Brodley, Joseph F, 1990. "Antitrust Law and Innovation Cooperation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 97-112, Summer.
  22. Shapiro, Carl & Willig, Robert D, 1990. "On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 113-130, Summer.
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