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L’individualisation de l’impôt sur le revenu : équitable ou pas ?

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  • Damien Échevin

Abstract

[eng] An estimate using a microsimulation model suggests that approximately 46% of married couples in France benefit from a tax gain as a result of marriage and 22% suffer a tax penalty. Influenced by factors such as tax allowances, minimum thresholds and specific deductions, the annual average tax gain per household is 1080, and the penalty is 185. Tax individualisation cancels gains and losses resulting from marriage at a total cost to households of approx. 3.7 billion, or7% of income tax revenue (2002 Finance Act). The tax on earned income is reduced by 286 on average for women. Astudy of the redistributive effects of the reform, taking into account the potential effects of female participation in the labour market, shows that redistribution increases overall after the reform. Vertical fairness increases, while horizontal unfairness remains unchanged. The specific effect on the female labour supply slightly but significantly reduces the redistributive effects of the reform. [fre] À partir d’un modèle de micro-simulation, on évalue à près de 46% la proportion de couples mariés en France bénéficiant d’un gain fiscal moyen annuel au mariage de + 1080 et à 22% la proportion de couples mariés pénalisés par le mariage pour un montant de -185 en moyenne par ménage (du fait de l’existence de la décote, du minimum de perception, d’abattements spécifiques…). L’individualisation de l’impôt sur le revenu (IR) annule les gains et les pertes au mariage pour un coût global pour les ménages de l’ordre de 3,7 Md , soit 7% de l’IR (loi de finances pour 2002). La taxe sur l’activité est réduite de 286 en moyenne pour les femmes. Une analyse des effets redistributifs de la réforme prenant en compte les effets potentiels sur la participation féminine au marché du travail montre que la redistribution augmente globalement suite à la réforme, du fait d’un renforcement de l’équité verticale et sans modification de l’inéquité horizontale. L’effet propre à l’offre de travail des femmes réduit légèrement mais significativement les effets redistributifs de la réforme.

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  • Damien Échevin, 2003. "L’individualisation de l’impôt sur le revenu : équitable ou pas ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 160(4), pages 149-165.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2003_num_160_4_6925
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2003.6925
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2003.6925
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    1. Guillaume Allegre & Hélène Périvier & Muriel Pucci, 2019. "Imposition des couples en France et statut marital : simulation de trois réformes du quotient conjugal," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2019-05, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1u4nmlgre68gopcegtmgm6cb5s is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1lc919l7sm8pt87iaubt8n43lo is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Guillaume Allegre & Hélène Périvier & Muriel Pucci Porte, 2019. "Imposition des couples en France et statut marital : simulation de trois réformes du quotient familial," Working Papers hal-03403189, HAL.
    5. Monemou, Ouo-Ouo Waïta, 2015. "Contribution à l'amélioration de la performance en matière d'imposition sur le revenu en République de Guinée," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/15109 edited by Castagnède, Bernard.

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