IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecoprv/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6116.html

Présentation générale

Author

Listed:
  • Denis Phan
  • Lise Rochaix-Ranson

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Denis Phan & Lise Rochaix-Ranson, 2000. "Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 97-105.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6116
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6116
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 641-642, June.
    2. Claude Henry, 1974. "Option Values in the Economics of Irreplaceable Assets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(5), pages 89-104.
    3. Agnar Sandmo, 1999. "Asymmetric Information and Public Economics: The Mirrlees-Vickrey Nobel Prize," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 165-180, Winter.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    5. Herbert A. Simon & Massimo Egidi & Ricardo Viale & Robin Marris, 1992. "Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 409, June.
    6. Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(2), pages 421-452.
    7. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    8. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wipprich, Mark, 2007. "Preisbindung als Kooperationsinstrument in Wertschöpfungsnetzwerken," Arbeitspapiere 60, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    2. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
    3. Surajeet Chakravarty & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Construction Contracts (or “How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?”)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1714, CESifo.
    4. repec:cam:camjip:2101 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Bester, Helmut, 2013. "Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 302-311.
    6. Matthew Stephenson & Andrew Miller & Xyn Sun & Bhargav Annem & Rohan Parikh, 2025. "NDAI Agreements," Papers 2502.07924, arXiv.org.
    7. Giovanna Devetag & Enrico Zaninotto, 2001. "The imperfect hiding: Some introductory concepts and preliminary issues on modularity," ROCK Working Papers 010, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 13 Jun 2008.
    8. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
    9. Mansaray, Alhassan & Coleman, Simeon & Ataullah, Ali & Sirichand, Kavita, 2021. "Residual government ownership in public-private partnership projects," Journal of Government and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(C).
    10. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2016. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 172-200, January.
    11. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
    12. Giorgio Zanarone & Desmond (Ho-Fu) Lo & Tammy L. Madsen, 2016. "The double-edged effect of knowledge acquisition: How contracts safeguard pre-existing resources," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(10), pages 2104-2120, October.
    13. Claudio Balestri, 2014. "Political Organizations, Interest Groups and Citizens Engagement: An Integrated Model of Democracy," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 533-543, December.
    14. Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2019. "Efficient investments in the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 247-278.
    15. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2004. "Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 3-30, March.
    16. Auster, Sarah & Pavoni, Nicola, 2024. "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    17. Olivier Meier & Aurélie Sannajust, 0. "The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-16.
    18. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
    19. Hojin Jung, 2016. "Renegotiation on incomplete procurement contracts," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(23), pages 2125-2138, May.
    20. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 470-499.
    21. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2001. "Productivité et réglementation environnementale: une analyse de l'hypothèse de Porter," Cahiers de recherche 0107, Université Laval - Département d'économique.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6116. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.